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tal: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Literature 
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This paper provides a quantitative review of the literature on the repercussions of idio-
syncratic information on firms’ cost of equity (CoE) capital. In total, I reconsider the 
results of 113 unique studies examining the CoE effects of information Quantity, Preci-
sion and Asymmetry. My results suggest that the association between firm-specific in-
formation and CoE is subject to moderate effects. First, the link between Quantity and 
CoE is moderated by disclosure types and country-level factors in that firms in compar-
atively weakly regulated countries tend to enjoy up to four times greater CoE benefits 
from more expansive disclosure—depending on the type of disclosure—than firms in 
strongly regulated markets. Second, a negative relationship between Precision and CoE 
is only significant in studies using non-accrual quality proxies for Precision and risk 
factor-based (RFB)/valuation model-based (VMB) proxies for CoE. Third, almost all 
VMB studies confirm the positive association between Asymmetry and CoE, but there is 
notable variation in the conclusions reached when ex post CoE measurers are used.  
 
Keywords: meta-analysis; idiosyncratic information; information risk; expected returns; 
cost of equity capital; implied cost of capital  
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Idiosyncratic Information and the Cost of Equity Capi-
tal: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Literature 
1 Introduction  
Extensive literature in accounting and finance investigates the extent to which idiosyn-
cratic information affects price formation and return structures in capital markets. This 
strand of research commonly tests the proposition that firms with high (low) quality 
information environments should enjoy relatively low (high) cost of equity (CoE) capi-
tal. Specifically, it is conjectured that firms can lower their CoE if they disclose more 
value-relevant information to investors (Quantity), provide information of higher accu-
racy (Precision) and disseminate information more widely between investor groups 
(Asymmetry). While analytical works have modelled these propositions elegantly (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Easley and O'Hara (2004), and Lambert, Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2012)), the empirical evidence regarding their predictions is mixed (e.g., 
Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008), McInnis (2010), and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009)).  
Given, on the one hand, that the proper measurement of a firm’s CoE (alias ex-
pected rate of returns) is an ongoing debate in itself (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee (2005), 
and Easton and Monahan (2016)), and, on the other hand, that proxies for the infor-
mation attributes (i.e., Quantity, Precision, Asymmetry) are large in number, as in-
formed by both accounting and finance research, the empirical literature is voluminous 
and the conclusions reached vary widely depending on the proxies used by researchers. 
With that in mind, the main objective of this paper is to offer a systematic review of the 
extant literature to examine the reasons underlying the variation in results. In particular, 
this review meta-analyses the associations of Quantity and Precision with CoE and pro-
vides a descriptive summary of extant findings on the link between Asymmetry and 
CoE.1,2 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to quantitatively summarize 
                                                 
1  Meta-analysis is a statistical approach that summarizes empirical findings of multiple studies. Meta-
analysis techniques require the use of effect size which—in meta-analytic accounting research—is 
commonly the study’s Pearson r correlation coefficient between the dependent and independent varia-
ble of interest (Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson (1982), Khlif and Chalmers (2015)). 
2  Given vast variation in research designs between studies examining the impact of Asymmetry on CoE 
(e.g., some studies use yearly, others monthly data; some focus on portfolio-level, other on firm-level) 
a meta-analysis is not feasible; hence, I focus on descriptive statistics only when examining this link.  
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all the links between idiosyncratic information and CoE within a unified framework. As 
such, it complements narrative literature reviews on this topic (e.g., Artiach and 
Clarkson (2011), Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010), Healy and Palepu (2001), and 
Kothari, So, and Verdi (2016)) and extends Souissi and Khlif (2012) who focus on dis-
closure (Quantity) effects only.3 
2 Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses 
To facilitate the structure of this review, I present a conceptual framework based on 
which I select the studies in my sample (see Figure 1). The direct links between Quanti-
ty, Precision, Asymmetry and CoE are widely consistent with analytical work (e.g., 
Easley and O'Hara (2004), Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson (1996), and Lewellen and 
Shanken (2002)) and substantiated by empirical evidence. Next, I provide a succinct 
narrative review of some notable studies examining the CoE effects of firm-specific 
information in order to pinpoint prevailing debates in the extant work, reveal commonly 
used information proxies, and offer guidance towards the creation of meaningful sub-
groups in later analyses. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
2.1 Information Quantity and Cost of Equity  
Literature on estimation risk demonstrates that if the amount of information about a firm 
is low, investors have difficulties to accurately estimate the return and cash flow param-
eters of this particular firm. This parameter uncertainty makes such firms a riskier in-
vestment vis-à-vis otherwise comparable firms, and hence induces higher CoE (e.g., 
Clarkson et al. (1996), and Lewellen and Shanken (2002)). A significant proportion of 
the literature examines the association between Quantity and firms’ CoE, with 56 such 
papers analyzed in this study. One stream of research uses simple proxies—such as firm 
age or period of listing—as measures of information quantity and shows that these prox-
                                                 
3  Similar to this study, Souissi and Khlif (2012) also meta-analyze the link between disclosure and CoE; 
however, my analysis differs from theirs in that it operates a larger sample (56 vs. 22 studies), covers 
a longer sampling period (1997-2010 vs. 1997-2017) and analyses substantially more firm-years 
(342,116 vs 9,553). Furthermore, I include both mandatory and voluntary disclosure studies, while 
Souissi and Khlif (2012) focus on voluntary disclosure only. 
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ies are negatively correlated with CoE (e.g., Barry and Brown (1984, 1985), Clarkson 
and Thompson (1990), Kumar, Sorescu, Boehme, and Danielsen (2008), and Zhang 
(2006)). A second stream uses firms’ disclosure levels as proxies for Quantity and am-
ple evidence exists confirming a negative association with CoE (e.g., Baginski and 
Rakow (2012), Botosan (1997), Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014), Cao, 
Myers, Tsang, and Yang (2017), Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999), Francis, Khurana, 
and Pereira (2005), Fu, Kraft, and Zhang (2012), Kothari, Li, and Short (2009), and Ng 
and Rezaee (2015)). Thus, I formulate Hypothesis 1: 
 
H1: The larger (smaller) the quantity of available information about a firm, the lower 
(higher) its CoE.  
2.2 Information Precision and Cost of Equity  
In a seminal paper, Easley and O'Hara (2004) demonstrate that a firm’s CoE decreases 
with the accuracy of available information about the future value of the firm. Essential-
ly, this means that investors demand to be rewarded for bearing uncertainty about a 
firm’s prospects stemming from imprecise information given to them, implying that 
firms that disclose higher quality information to investors can benefit from reduced 
CoE. This proposition is thoroughly researched in the literature (e.g., 38 papers are as-
signed to this link in my analysis) and the extant work can be categorized into two ma-
jor strands: accounting/earnings quality and security analyst forecast-based studies.   
The first stream is pioneered by Francis, La Fond, Olsson and Shipper (2004, 
2005). The authors examine the association between the quality of accounting infor-
mation and CoE, and demonstrate that firms’ CoE decreases as their earnings quality 
measures increase (e.g., accrual quality, value relevance). However, in an influential 
paper, Core, Guay and Verdi (2008) strongly question the validity of these early results. 
Despite continuous evidence for the proposition that earnings/accounting quality is neg-
atively related to CoE (e.g., Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005), Barth, Konchitchki, and 
Landsman (2013), and Hou (2015)), this link is challenged in a number of papers (e.g., 
Cohen (2008), Khan (2008), and McInnis (2010)).  
The second stream of research uses security analyst forecasts to proxy for infor-
mation precision. Extant literature argues that the less uncertainty exists about the pro-
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spects of a firm, the greater the consensus among security analysts and the more precise 
their forecasts (e.g., Barry and Brown (1985), Barron and Stuerke (1998), and Barron, 
Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998)). Botosan and Plumlee (2013) provide evidence that total 
analyst forecast precision (AFP) is negatively associated with CoE. Botosan et al. 
(2004) decompose total analyst forecast precision into private and public information 
components and show that public (private) AFP is negatively (positively) associated 
with CoE. Interestingly, Barron, Sheng, and Thevenot (2012) find that for firms with 
limited public information, private AFP is in fact negatively associated with CoE. This 
might be explained by the dual effect of private information precision. On the one hand, 
more precise private information might increase information asymmetry, which then 
induces higher CoE (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1991)) but, on the other hand, it 
might also decrease CoE when the quantity of public information is limited. Simply put, 
private information is still better than no information at all (Easley and O'Hara (2004), 
Lambert et al. (2012)). Given this empirical evidence along with the analytical insights 
from Easley and O'Hara (2004), I formulate Hypothesis 2: 
 
H2: The higher (lower) the information precision of a firm, the lower (higher) its CoE. 
2.3 Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity  
Easley and O'Hara (2004) furthermore show that as the fraction of uninformed investors 
as well as the number of private signals about the future value of the firm increases, its 
CoE also increases: uninformed investors—who only have access to public infor-
mation—require compensation for “losing out” to privately informed investors—who 
have access to both public and private information—when making investment deci-
sions. The greater these informational disadvantages are, the larger the CoE premium 
induced by Asymmetry. Numerous papers investigate this conjecture empirically (e.g., 
22 such papers are included in my analysis) and mainly use market microstructure prox-
ies (e.g., PIN scores, bid-ask spreads) to gauge the degree of informational disparity 
between investor groups.4,5 Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) were the first to doc-
                                                 
4  PIN scores measure the probability that the next trade order is from a privately informed investor; i.e., 
based on private information, with higher PIN scores signifying greater Asymmetry. The notion under-
lying the PIN model is that while it is impossible to directly observe which trades are based on private 
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ument a positive association between CoE and PIN scores. Conversely, Mohanram and 
Rajgopal (2009, p. 241) conclude that “there is not much evidence to support the inter-
pretation that information risk, proxied by PIN, is a source of priced information risk.” 
However, these authors acknowledge that while their paper suggests “PIN is not priced 
risk, it is difficult to make more general statements about the pricing of information risk 
since information risk can […] be proxied by different empirical variables”. In fact, 
using spread-based proxies, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Bhattacharya, Ecker, 
Olsson, and Schipper (2012), and Levi and Zhang (2015)—among others—document a 
significantly positive association with CoE. This corroborates Hypothesis 3:   
 
H3: The higher (lower) the information asymmetry between investors, the higher (low-
er) the firm’s CoE.  
2.4 Summary of Prior Empirical Evidence  
The extant empirical evidence may be summarized as follows. First, whenever the link 
between Quantity and CoE is tested, the current research prefers using disclosure in-
stead of simple proxies for information quantity as indicated by 56 studies using the 
former and only five studies using the latter (i.e., Barry and Brown (1984, 1985), 
Clarkson and Thompson (1990), Kumar et al. (2008), and Zhang (2006)). However, it 
should be noted that proxies for disclosure levels tend to measure disclosure along both 
a quantity and quality dimension, which makes them noisy estimates of Quantity.6 Fur-
thermore, wide variation in research designs, disclosure types examined and disclosure 
metrics used by researchers all possibly moderate the overall negative relation between 
disclosure and CoE.7 Hence, more evidence along the lines of Richardson and Welker 
                                                                                                                                               
information, one can use imbalances between buy and sell orders to infer the probability of infor-
mation-based trading for a given stock (e.g., Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004), Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, 
and Paperman (1996), and Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1997)).  
5  Bid-ask spreads are a measure of the adverse selection problem market makers are exposed to and 
assumed to increase with information asymmetry (Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985)). Jack Treynor, publishing under his pseudonym Walter Bagehot (1971), gives an intuitive ex-
planation as to why greater bid-ask spreads are associated with greater information asymmetry. 
6  For instance, Cheng, Collins, and Huang (2006, p. 179) state that “while prior empirical research has 
used the quantity of disclosure as a proxy for the quality of disclosure quality, in many cases disclo-
sure quantity and quality are not separable information attributes.” 
7  For instance, some studies investigate mandatory disclosure (e.g., Campbell et al. (2014), and Core, 
Hail, and Verdi (2015)), while others concentrate on voluntary disclosure aspects (e.g., Botosan and 
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(2001) and Mangena, Li, and Tauringana (2016) on the types of disclosure that are par-
ticularly CoE-relevant seems beneficial. Second, accounting quality, and more specifi-
cally earnings quality, appears to be an important determinant of firms’ information 
Precision. However, since the study of Core et al. (2008), its association with CoE is 
subject to controversy. Moreover, CoE tends to decrease with total AFP, but results are 
mixed for its relationship with the private and public components of analysts’ infor-
mation sets. Third, Asymmetry is commonly measured by market microstructure-based 
proxies, and while there is an ongoing debate about the pricing of PIN (e.g., Botosan 
and Plumlee (2013), and Duarte and Young (2009)), the negative relationship between 
bid-ask spreads and firms’ CoE seems to be widely accepted.  
3 Cost of Equity Measurement  
Firms’ CoE capital is the key variable of interest in this paper and its empirical meas-
urement differs across studies. Some researchers use ex post returns to proxy for CoE 
(e.g., Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006), and Konchitchki, Luo, Ma, and Wu (2016)), 
while others apply ex ante estimates (e.g., Barth et al. (2013), Bhattacharya et al. 
(2012), Cohen (2008), and Hou (2015)). I classify those studies that conduct asset pric-
ing tests (i.e., regressing realized returns on possible risk factors) or use average realized 
returns as CoE proxies as ex post and refer to them as realized return-based (REAL) in 
my analyses. I further divide the remaining “non-REAL” papers, which use ex ante CoE 
specifications, into two categories: risk-factor based (RFB) studies, which calculate 
CoE by multiplying estimated factor loadings from traditional asset pricing models 
(e.g., CAPM, FF3) with respective factor returns, and valuation-model based (VMB) 
studies, which reverse-engineer valuation models (such as the dividend discount, resid-
                                                                                                                                               
Plumlee (2002), and Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008)); some papers focus on financial disclosure 
(e.g., Baginski and Rakow (2012), and Evans (2016)), while others examine non-financial disclosure 
(e.g., Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang (2011), and Ng and Rezaee (2012)); and, some authors use self-
constructed disclosure scores (e.g., Botosan (1997), and Kothari et al. (2009)), while others rely on 
commercially available ones (e.g., Healy et al. (1999), and Richardson and Welker (2001)), and yet 
others use simple dummy variables to distinguish between disclosing and non-disclosing firms (e.g., 
Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007), and Cao et al. (2017)). 
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ual income or abnormal earnings growth model) to estimate firms’ implied cost of capi-
tal (ICC).8,9 
Empirical proxies are, by definition, inherently flawed (Rao, 1973) and so are the 
aforementioned return measures. For instance, Elton (1999) states: “The use of average 
realized returns as a proxy for expected returns relies on a belief that information sur-
prises tend to cancel out over the period of a study and realized returns are therefore an 
unbiased estimate of expected returns. However, I believe that there is ample evidence 
that this belief is misplaced” (p. 1199). In a similar vein, Fama and French (1997) argue 
that RFB proxies are “woefully imprecise estimates of the cost of equity” (p. 154) given 
that these estimates are based on noisy past realized returns. Ultimately, the unexpected 
news component in realized returns tends to corrupt the reliability of factor loading and 
factor premia estimates in RFB models. Finally, Easton and Monahan (2005) examine a 
number of different VMB estimates and conclude that—due to the optimism in ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts— “these proxies are unreliable” (p.501). In addition, VMB 
measures encounter issues arising from firm-specific estimation (e.g., Easton (2009), 
Wang (2015)) and growth assumptions made by researchers (e.g., Easton (2006)). 
Despite these concerns, two major conclusions regarding the empirical validity of 
the different measures seem justified. First, proxying for CoE by realized returns is 
problematic in that discount rate and cash-flow news constitute significant impacts on 
firm-level returns, making realized returns noisy estimates of CoE (e.g., Chen, Da, and 
Zhao (2013), Ogneva (2012), and Vuolteenaho (2002)). Second, VMB proxies show 
somewhat greater construct validity than RFB proxies in terms of association with fu-
ture realized returns, common risk-factors, and predictive power of returns (Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005), Botosan, Plumlee, and Wen (2011), Lee, So, and Wang (2010, 2015)). 
Taken together, this suggests that the measurement of CoE might partially explain 
                                                 
8  For a step-wise description of how to operationalize RFB estimates see, for instance, Barth et al. 
(2013), Landsman, Miller, Peasnell, and Yeh (2011), and O'Hanlon and Steele (2000).  
9  The intuition behind the ICC framework is straightforward: use a specific valuation model, accept the 
current stock price as at least semi-strong efficient and determine the internal rate of return that 
equates current stock price of the firm with expected future payoffs to shareholders, where future pay-
offs are commonly proxied by analysts’ earnings forecasts. The internal rate of return is then consid-
ered the market participants’ ex ante assessment of the firm’s CoE. See Botosan and Plumlee (2002), 
Claus and Thomas (2001), Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Gode and 
Mohanram (2003), Gordon and Gordon (1997), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) for common 
ICC measures.  
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mixed results across studies when analyzing the effects of Quantity, Precision and 
Asymmetry on firms’ CoE.   
4 Methodology  
The main objective of this paper is to provide a meta-analytic review of the literature on 
idiosyncratic information and firms’ CoE capital. However, only for H1 and H2 re-
search designs between studies are homogenous enough to carry out meta-analyses. 
Studies relating to H3 often lack necessary information and data comparability to con-
duct a meaningful meta-analysis (e.g., sample size information is inconsistently report-
ed; some studies use yearly data, others use monthly data; some focus on the portfolio-
level, others focus on the firm-level). Hence, for H3 I only provide descriptive statistics 
(e.g., fraction of studies confirming/rejecting the hypothesis; proxies used and propor-
tions thereof).  
4.1 Data Collection and Sample   
In line with research hypotheses H1-H3, I search for different combinations of several 
keywords (shown in Table 1) in the following databases to identify relevant studies: ISI 
Web of Science; ScienceDirect; Emerald Management Ejournals; and SSRN. A review 
of all top-tier journals in accounting and finance as well as the reference list of all iden-
tified articles complements my search.10 I exclude analytical papers (e.g., Bertomeu, 
Beyer, and Dye (2011), Cheynel (2013), Christensen, de la Rosa, and Feltham (2010), 
Dutta and Nezlobin (2017), Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007), Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia (2007), and Strobl (2013)) and studies lacking statistical information re-
quired for the meta-analysis of H1 and H2 (e.g., Aboody et al. (2005), Beneish, Billings, 
and Hodder (2008), Chen, Shevlin, and Tong (2007), Clement, Frankel, and Miller 
(2003), and Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2012)) during this process.  
 
                                                 
10  Accounting Journals: Accounting Review, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Contemporary Accounting Research, and 
Review of Accounting Studies; Finance Journals: Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Econom-
ics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, and Review of 
Finance.  
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(Table 1 about here) 
 
As noted above, the literature applies various measures for Quantity, Precision, 
Asymmetry and CoE. Based on the most commonly used proxies in the literature, I cre-
ate several sub-groups for each information attribute and CoE (see Figure 1) and code 
each study in my sample accordingly. For instance, Francis et al. (2004) examine the 
impact of seven different earnings quality measures on two implied cost of capital prox-
ies; hence, I classify this study as using “Accounting Quality” proxies for information 
precision and “VMB” proxies for CoE. The coding of studies requires my judgment as 
to which category a paper fits best; hence, this may induce sampling bias in that one 
might arrive at different classifications for some studies.11 Moreover, I exclude some 
insightful papers from the sample because the novelty of the proxies applied in these 
studies hinders their allocation to one of my sub-groups. For example, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Ni, Pittman, and Saadi (2013) put forward firms’ geographic distance from 
financial centers as a measure of information asymmetry and show that CoE decreases 
with proximity; Cao, Myers, Myers, and Omer (2015) find that company reputation is 
negatively related to CoE, and Muino and Trombetta (2009) document a significant 
impact of distorted graph disclosure on CoE. Furthermore, I focus on firm-level results, 
so country-level studies are excluded from the analysis (e.g., Bhattacharya, Daouk, and 
Welker (2003), and Li (2015)). 
4.2 Meta-Analysis Techniques 
4.2.1 Effect Size  
Meta-analysis techniques require the use of effect size which—in meta-analytic ac-
counting research—is commonly the study’s Pearson r correlation coefficient between 
the dependent and independent variable of interest (Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson 
                                                 
11  For example, Baginski and Rakow (2012) examine the CoE effects of management earnings forecast 
disclosure policy. They measure disclosure policy as the product of three dimensions: Supplier, Fre-
quency and Precision. Given that (1) their proxy is based on two Quantity dimensions (Supplier, Fre-
quency) but only one Precision dimension and (2) their main contribution relates to voluntary disclo-
sure—“we extend the literature by examining a specific type of voluntary disclosure rather than dis-
closure in the aggregate” (p. 317)—I classify their paper as a Quantity rather than a Precision study.  
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(1982), Khlif and Chalmers (2015)).12 If a study only reports regression results, I con-
vert t-statistics into r coefficients as √𝑡2 (𝑡2 + 𝑑𝑓⁄ ), where df is degrees of freedom. If 
only p-values are provided, corresponding Z scores can be obtained from the standard 
normal table which I then transfer into r coefficients by using  𝑍 √𝑁⁄ , where N is sam-
ple size (Rosenthal, 1991). 
Whenever a study uses multiple, but similar, measures for a variable (say, differ-
ent proxies for earnings quality), I record the study’s average effect size. Therefore, 
these studies only appear once in the analysis (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). However, if a 
study tests different proxies for different samples (say, one RFB and one VMB CoE 
sample), I record the effect size for each sub-sample separately. Therefore, these studies 
appear twice in the analysis. To clarify, 56 studies for the link between Quantity and 
CoE contribute 62 observations to my analysis (Precision: 35 studies and 48 observa-
tions; Asymmetry: 22 studies and 28 observations).   
Also, where necessary, I multiply a study’s effect size by negative one to ensure 
consistent interpretation across proxies and to conform to the intuition of the underlying 
hypotheses of this paper. This is required because the interpretation of results varies 
depending on which proxies are used: some proxies are constructed such that higher 
values also signal higher information quality, while for others lower values indicate 
higher information quality. For instance, in most studies, higher analyst-based measures 
signal higher Precision—confirming H2 if a negative correlation with CoE is observed. 
In contrast, lower earnings quality proxies usually indicate higher information preci-
sion—confirming H2 if a positive, not negative, correlation with CoE is observed. In 
such instances, I multiply the effect size (of earnings quality) by negative one to reverse 
and re-align the interpretation of results with the intuition of the underlying hypothesis 
(H2). 
After the effect size for each study is calculated, I estimate the mean correlation 
(?̅?) for the population as shown in Eq. (1), where 𝑁𝑖 is the sample size and 𝑟𝑖 is the 
Pearson correlation coefficient for study i. 
 
?̅? =  
∑(𝑟𝑖𝑁𝑖)
∑ 𝑁𝑖
 (1) 
                                                 
12  I use Spearman correlations, if Pearson correlations are not reported.  
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The population variance (𝑆𝑝
2) is estimated as the difference between observed variance 
(𝑆𝑟
2) and the sampling error variance (𝑆𝑒
2) as shown in equations (2) to (4), where K is 
the total number of studies included in the analysis.  
 
𝑆𝑝
2 =  𝑆𝑟
2 −  𝑆𝑒
2 (2) 
 
𝑆𝑟
2 =
∑ 𝑁𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
∑ 𝑁𝑖
   (3) 
 
𝑆𝑒
2 =
(1 −  ?̅?2)2𝐾
∑ 𝑁𝑖
   (4) 
 
Eventually, I calculate the 95% confidence interval as follows: 
 
[?̅? − 𝑆𝑝𝑍0.975; ?̅? +  𝑆𝑝𝑍0.975 ] =  [?̅? −  𝑆𝑝(1.96); ?̅? + 𝑆𝑝(1.96)]  (5) 
4.2.2 Homogeneity Tests  
To test for homogeneity in the data—that is, to examine if variation in results is due to 
sampling errors or moderating effects—two methods are followed. First, I put the sam-
pling error variance into perspective to observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ) to reveal the degree 
to which the residual variance is trivial: if more than 75 percent of the variation in re-
sults can be attributed to sampling error (the suggested cut-off in the literature), then the 
relation under investigation is considered to be homogenous and unmoderated (Ahmed 
and Courtis (1999), Khlif and Chalmers (2015), Pearlman, Schmidt, and Hunter 
(1980)). Second, I calculate the chi-square test statistic shown in equation (6), where 
high statistical significance rejects the null of homogeneity, indicating that moderating 
effects might impact upon results across studies (K-1 is the degrees of freedom and N = 
∑ 𝑁𝑖). While statistically powerful, it should be noted that chi-square statistics are di-
rectly proportional to sample size (Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999), which makes it 
difficult to accept homogeneity at conventional levels in large sample studies like this 
one. 
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𝜒𝐾−1
2 =
𝑁𝑆𝑟
2
(1 −  ?̅?2)2
 (6) 
4.2.3 Sample Size  
Most of the papers analyzed in this study report results for a multi-period sample which 
poses the question of how to define sample size (i.e., 𝑁𝑖) in equations (1) to (6). Using 
the number of unique firms appears to be most appealing. However, this information is 
often missing. Conversely, the number of firm-years (firm-quarters or firm-months) is 
reported most consistently but might bias meta-analytic results towards studies spanning 
longer sampling periods without necessarily covering more firms. I address this point as 
follows: when transforming t-statistics (p-values) from regression results into r coeffi-
cients, I determine the degrees of freedom (sample size) based on the number of obser-
vations in the regression (e.g., firm-years). When summarizing among studies (e.g., 
computing mean effect size, population variance, chi-square statistic), I use the average 
number of firms (i.e., firm-years divided by number of years) as sample size. This main-
tains the internal integrity of each study—larger sample studies generate robuster re-
sults—while ensuring a “sampling-period-independent” impact on the meta-level. 
5 Results  
Fifty-six (56) studies in my sample examine the link between Quantity and CoE, 35 
examine the link with Precision and 22 examine the link with Asymmetry. Given that 
some papers provide findings for multiple sub-categories (for instance, RFB and VMB 
proxies), subsequent analyses are based on 62 observations for Quantity, 48 observa-
tions for Precision and 28 for Asymmetry. Hereafter, I use “observations” and “stud-
ies/papers” interchangeably but results always refer to the number of observations. The 
Quantity, Precision and Asymmetry studies included in my sample are shown in Table 
2, Table 3, and Table 4, respectively. Table 5 summarizes this information and reports 
descriptive statistics across the entire sample.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
- 13 - 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
5.1 Information Quantity and Cost of Equity 
Subsequent meta-analysis is limited to the disclosure literature, given that “simple-
proxy” studies are sparse (i.e., Barry and Brown (1984, 1985), Clarkson and Thompson 
(1990), Kumar et al. (2008), and Zhang (2006)). Sixty-two (62) observations in my 
sample analyze the link between Quantity and CoE of which most pertain to published 
work (n=50; 81%) and appear in higher-tier journals (37; 60%).13 Ten percent of studies 
use realized returns to proxy for CoE (n=6), with VMB measures prevailing in the dis-
closure literature (VMB: 50; 81%; RFB: 6; 10%). Whilst some studies include firms 
from multiple countries in their sample (13; 21%), the great majority are single-country 
studies (49; 79%). Interestingly, only 25 observations (40%) relate to US firms—which 
is exceptionally low compared to the US-bias in Precision and Asymmetry studies (81 
and 86 percent, respectively)—and the remaining 37 studies either focus on non-US 
countries (29; 47%) or include inseparably both US and non-US firms (8; 13%) in their 
samples (see Table 5).  
In addition, Table 5 reports the type of disclosure examined and the disclosure 
metric used by researchers. I categorize 11 observations (18%) as having a clear focus 
on financial disclosure, 22 (35%) as evaluating non-financial disclosure aspects, and the 
remaining 29 (47%) as partial-financial (i.e. all studies with an emphasis on the general 
quality of firms’ disclosure). Most studies apply self-constructed indices to measure 
disclosure levels (38; 61%), followed by thirteen studies (21%) relying on third-party 
providers (e.g., AIMR, S&P scores) and eleven (18%) observations using simple dum-
my variables to distinguish between disclosing and non-disclosing firms.  
Examining the general conclusion of each paper, about 70 percent of all observa-
tions (n=44; 71%) tend to confirm the negative association between Quantity and CoE, 
six studies reject it (10%), and the remaining 12 papers (19%) provide 
                                                 
13  I refer to journals that have a score of three or four in the ABS 2015 list as higher-tier outlets and 
denote journals with a score of two and one as well as unraked and unpublished work as lower-tier. 
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mixed/conditional results for this link. For instance, Francis et al. (2008) show that the 
negative relation between disclosure and CoE vanishes after controlling for earnings 
quality; Evans (2016) and Kim and Shi (2011) suggest that the timeliness and the sign 
of earnings announcements (good/bad) as well as the degree of market competition are 
important conditioning variables; and Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) and Gietzmann 
and Ireland (2005) demonstrate that the impact of disclosure on CoE is extenuated by 
accounting conservatism (i.e., only firms adopting aggressive accounting policies can 
reduce their CoE by increased disclosure activity). This qualitative assessment is con-
sistent with meta-analytic results (see Table 6). The mean effect size between Quantity 
and CoE is -0.066 with a 95% confidence interval between -0.190 and 0.058, indicating 
that findings vary across studies. A highly significant χ² of 241.21 with 61 degrees of 
freedom along with only 26 percent of observed variance explained by sampling error 
(𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ) rejects the null of homogenous data and pinpoints the presence of moderating 
effects.  
 
(Table 6 about here) 
5.1.1 Measurement of Cost of Equity 
Dividing studies according to CoE measurement yields some interesting insights (Table 
6, Row II & III). The first sub-group includes those studies which use ex post returns 
(REAL) as proxies for CoE; the second group (RFB/VMB) contains studies applying 
either risk factor-based or valuation model-based CoE estimates. Total average effect 
size for the RFB/VMB group (r̅: -0.075 ± 0.129) is about three times larger than for the 
REAL group (-0.026 ± 0.037).14 However, none of the REAL studies examine the asso-
ciation in a pure financial disclosure setting—where CoE effects are most pro-
nounced—which tends to clarify the difference in effect size (Columns II-IV).15 More 
importantly, both effect sizes are insignificantly different from zero (p-value: 0.256 and 
0.171), indicating that CoE measurement does not explain mixed results in the litera-
ture.   
                                                 
14  Average effect size plus/minus two standard deviations (i.e., √Sp²) of the mean (i.e., 95% interval).  
15  The effect size for VMB proxies (r̅: -0.084 ± 0.128) is markedly stronger than for RFB measures (r̅: -
0.017 ± 0.071) which—as in the case of the REAL group—is attributable to the fact that none of the 
RFB studies focus on financial disclosure.  
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5.1.2 Measurement of Quantity  
Table 6 distinguishes studies according to the type of disclosure examined by research-
ers: financial (FF), partial-financial (PF) and non-financial (NF) disclosure studies. Row 
IV shows a statistically significant correlation of about 12 percent between CoE and FF 
studies (p-value: 0.019), but a markedly reduced and statistically insignificant effect 
size of only five percent for PF and NF studies (p-values: 0.358 and 0.361). This shows 
that financial disclosure is twice as important to investors than non-financial and partial-
financial disclosure. However, this is not to say that non-financial information is irrele-
vant. For example, a relatively large strand of research within the NF category (n=10; 
16%) documents a significantly negative association between corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) disclosure and CoE (r̅: -0.056 ± 0.022, untabulated).16 Moreover, findings 
are robust to researchers’ choice of how to measure disclosure levels; irrespective of 
using self-constructed disclosure indices (SCI) or simple dummy variables to proxy for 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms, the effect size is always significantly negative for 
FF studies (SCI: -0.101 ± 0.069; Dummy: -0.126± 0.106), but insignificant and much 
weaker for NF and PF studies (see Table 7).17  
 
(Table 7 about here) 
 
 Next, I examine if different disclosure requirements across countries moderate re-
sults. In doing so, I categorize my sample in three different ways. First, I distinguish 
between US and non-US studies. Second, I assign each study a disclosure regulation 
score and allocate studies with a score below the sample average of 0.83 to the LOW 
group and the remainder to the HIGH group.18 Third, I follow Souissi and Khlif (2012) 
and form groups based on countries’ transparency culture, where the high disclosure 
                                                 
16  CSR studies: Bachoo, Tan, and Wilson (2013), Clarkson, Fang, Li, and Richardson (2013), Déjean 
and Martinez (2009), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang (2014), Ng and Rezaee 
(2015), Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, and Marshall (2015), Reverte (2012), Richardson and Welker (2001), 
and Wu, Lin, and Wu (2014).  
17  Given that error variances (Se²) for FF and NF studies using externally provided disclosures scores 
(EXI) are larger than observed variances (Sr²), confidence intervals cannot be calculated and a com-
parison with PF studies is not meaningful.    
18  Consistent with Core et al. (2015), I measure the level of disclosure regulation by the index of disclo-
sure requirements in securities offerings from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). In the 
case of multi-country studies, I report a weighted average per observation (weight: firm-years per 
country).  
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environment group (HDE) includes studies conducted in the US, UK and Canada, and 
the low disclosure environment group (LDE) covers the remaining countries.19  
Table 8, Column V, shows that total disclosure effects are about 3.5 times larger 
in non-US studies (r̅: -0.139) than in US studies (-0.039). Similarly, studies concentrat-
ing on less regulated (LOW: -0.126) and less transparent countries (LDE: -0.141) doc-
ument an approximately 3 times stronger correlation between disclosure and CoE than 
studies focusing on more regulated and more transparent countries (HIGH: -0.062; 
HDE: -0.043). However, the magnitude of these differences varies according to disclo-
sure types: the CoE effect of financial disclosure in non-US settings is “only” 2.5 times 
larger than in US settings, while partial- and non-financial disclosure effects are about 3 
and 4.5 times larger (similar patterns can be observed for HIGH and LOW as well as 
HDE and LDE studies).20  
Higher mandatory disclosure requirements in the US (and in HIGH/HDE coun-
tries) may explain these differences in disclosure effects. Mandatory disclosure replaces 
and pre-empts benefits from voluntary disclosure, which is least pronounced for finan-
cial disclosure where financial reporting quality converges towards a uniform standard 
across countries (e.g. IFRS/US-GAAP convergence), and most pronounced for non-
financial disclosure where the difference in requirements between highly regulated 
countries (US/HIGH/HDE) and weakly regulated countries (non-US/LOW/LDE) is 
greatest (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Furthermore, within each sub-sample a substantial 
amount of variation in results is now attributable to sampling error (e.g., 𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄  ratios of 
0.54 and 0.48 for US and non-US studies vis-à-vis 0.26 for the sample as a whole); to-
gether with less significant chi-square statistics, this confirms that disclosure environ-
ments across countries do partially moderate results. 
 
(Table 8 about here) 
                                                 
19  LDE countries: Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sin-
gapore, Spain, Sweden Switzerland, Taiwan, and United Arab Emirates.  
20  It should be noted that while effect sizes differ markedly in magnitude, only some of them are statisti-
cally significant: US-PF, NonUS-PF, HIGH-FF, HDE-PF, LDE-PF. However, as the differences in ef-
fect sizes between disclosure environments and disclosure types are all highly significant (minimum t-
statistic 13.46, untabulated two-sample T-test), my conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged.  
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5.1.3 Summary of Results  
Figure 2 summarizes the key results from meta-analyzing the association between 
Quantity and CoE. Taken together, findings suggest that researchers’ choice of CoE 
measurement does not explain mixed results in the disclosure literature, but it is the type 
of disclosure (financial vs. partial-/non-financial) as well as the disclosure setting 
(strongly vs. weakly regulated countries) which moderates results: CoE effects emanat-
ing from partial-/non-financial disclosure are insignificant (rejecting H1), but economi-
cally and statistically material for financial disclosure (confirming H1). Furthermore, in 
countries where disclosure regulation and requirements are low (non-US/LOW/LDE), 
investors appreciate firms’ disclosure efforts to a much greater extent than in higher 
regulated environments (US/HIGH/HDE groups).  
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
5.2 Information Precision and Cost of Equity 
Forty-eight (48) observations analyze the CoE effects of Precision, most of which relate 
to published work (n=42; 88%) and appear in higher-tier journals (29; 60%). The sam-
ple is strongly tilted towards US firms, with only nine observations (19%) stemming 
from non-US data. About one-third of observations use realized returns to proxy for 
CoE (REAL: 16; 33%) and the remaining two-thirds mainly apply VMB estimates 
(VMB: 26; 54%; RFB: 6; 13%). The vast majority of studies (41; 85%) rely on account-
ing/earnings quality measures for information precision, with analyst-based proxies (7; 
15%) being the exception (see Table 5).  
Focusing on the general conclusion of each paper, about half of all observations 
(n=27; 56%) confirm the negative association between Precision and CoE, eight studies 
tend to reject it (17%), and the remaining papers provide mixed/conditional results for 
this link (13; 27%). For instance, Ogneva (2012) shows that only after controlling for 
cash flow shocks in realized returns does a negative association with Precision exist; 
Kim and Qi (2010) confirm H2 after excluding low-priced firms from their sample, and 
Mashruwala and Mashruwala (2011) document a negative relation only in January. This 
qualitative assessment is consistent with meta-analytic results (shown in Table 9). The 
mean effect size between Precision and CoE is -0.048 with a 95% confidence interval 
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between -0.142 and 0.047, illustrating that results are mixed across studies. A highly 
significant χ² of 177.89 with 47 degrees of freedom along with only 27 percent of ob-
served variance explained by sampling error (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ) rejects the null of homogenous 
data and signposts the presence of moderating effects.  
 
(Table 9 about here) 
5.2.1 Measurement of Cost of Equity    
As before, I divide my sample into two sub-groups according to CoE measurement 
(Table 9, Row II & III). Total average effect size for the REAL group is -0.014.21 The 
effect size for RFB/VMB is about seven times larger (r̅: -0.082) and almost significant 
at the 10% level (p-value: 0.111). The difference between the two effect sizes is highly 
significant (t-statistic: -165.1; untabulated two-sample T-test). Overall, this proves that 
the measurement of CoE has a moderating effect on results. While there seems to be no 
relation between Precision and a firm’s realized returns, the association with RFB and 
VMB proxies is statistically and economically meaningful.22 
5.2.2 Measurement of Information Precision  
In a similar vein, the empirical measurement of Precision might explain the overall in-
significant correlation with CoE (r̅: -0.048 ± 0.095). However, irrespective of whether 
Precision is proxied by accounting quality (-0.044 ±0.085) or analyst forecasts (-0.067 
± 0.139), the relations with CoE remain insignificant (Table 9, Row IV). Moreover, 
results suggest that data heterogeneity stems from RFB/VMB studies, since variation 
across REAL results is mainly due to sampling error (χ²: 9.55, df: 15). Therefore, I fo-
cus subsequent moderator effect analyses on RFB/VMB studies. 
Table 9, Row II, shows that the relation between CoE and analyst-based proxies is 
twice as strong (r̅: -0.142 vs. -0.074), considerably more significant (p-value: 0.000 vs. 
0.122) and less heterogonous (χ²: 9.03* vs. 83.21***) than for accounting quality-based 
                                                 
21  As the sampling error variance (Se²) is larger than the observed variance (Sr²), the population variance 
(Sp²) is negative; thus, no meaningful confidence interval can be determined.   
22  The effect size between information precision and RFB proxies (r̅: -0.100 ± 0.084) is slightly stronger 
than for VMB proxies (r̅: -0.073 ± 0.103); however, as the number of RFB studies is low (n=6), a sep-
arate sub-group is not meaningful.   
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proxies. This stronger correlation might be explained by the fact that analyst-based 
proxies are more volatile measures of Precision than accounting quality proxies, with 
greater variance leading to higher correlations coefficients. For instance, Barron et al.’s 
(1998) AFP measure is perceived to be highly sensitive to outliers and measurement 
error (Barron et al., 2012, p. 21) which makes it a highly dispersed proxy for Precision. 
In contrast, Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality (AQ) metric—the most widely 
used measure of accounting quality—is estimated from a time-series of firm fundamen-
tals that increases its robustness and decreases dispersion. To this extent, accounting 
quality studies draw a more conservative picture of the relation between Precision and 
CoE.  
A sufficiently large number of accounting quality-based studies (n=41) allows for 
further analysis of this subset of observations.23 Designated by a significant chi-square 
statistic (χ²: 83.21***, df: 26), the link between accounting quality and RFB/VMB es-
timates is exposed to moderator effects—REAL results, on the other hand, are unmod-
erated, but economically weak. As noted before, AQ metrics are a common proxy for 
accounting quality. Table 10, Row II, sub-samples data accordingly and shows that the 
relation between the AQ-metric group and CoE remains moderated (χ²: 68.04***, df: 
14) and insignificant (r̅: -0.082 ± 0.120), while the opposite is observed for non-AQ 
metrics—such as earnings value relevance or accounting conservatism (χ²: 13.08, df: 
11; r̅: -0.063 ± 0.020). Differently stated, as the proxies in my sample become more 
heterogenous, the correlation with CoE becomes less, not more, moderated which is 
contrary to expectations in that one may assume that studies sharing the same underly-
ing empirical measure would also yield similar results. Therefore, the debate over 
whether Precision impacts upon CoE is in fact a debate over whether accrual quality 
affects CoE: results for the remaining studies, which at times use very diverse measures, 
corroborate the hypothesis that firms with higher Precision tend to enjoy lower CoE. 
 
(Table 10 about here) 
                                                 
23  Given that my sample includes only seven analyst-based studies, further in-depth analysis is not 
meaningful.    
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5.2.3 Summary of Results  
Figure 3 reviews the main meta-analytic findings. Overall, the statistical and economic 
significance of the relationship between information precision and CoE tends to depend 
on the measurement of CoE: higher Precision leads to lower CoE if measured by 
RFB/VMB proxies, but this link is trivial in asset pricing tests and when average real-
ized returns are used. Furthermore, a material association between RFB/VMB proxies 
and analyst-based as well as non-AQ metric-based studies is found. However, this rela-
tion is insignificant in studies using AQ metrics as measures of accounting quality; H2 
is confirmed when non-AQ and analyst-based proxies are used for information precision 
and RFB/VMB proxies for CoE but rejected when AQ and REAL proxies are applied.  
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
5.3 Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity 
Twenty-eight (28) observations in my sample examine the link between Asymmetry and 
CoE of which most relate to published work (n=25; 89%) and appear in higher-tier 
journals (24; 86%). The sample is strongly tilted towards US studies, with only four 
observations (14%) relying on non-US data. Three-quarters of observations apply ex 
post estimates for CoE (REAL: 21; 75%) and the remainder exclusively use VMB 
measures (VMB: 7; 25%). The vast majority of studies (24; 86%) utilize market micro-
structure proxies (i.e., PIN scores, bid-ask spreads), whereas non-microstructure esti-
mates (e.g., analyst-based proxies) are rarely used (see Table 5). 
As noted above, a meaningful meta-analysis for the link between Asymmetry and 
CoE is not possible. Therefore, proceeding analyses focus on the general conclusion of 
each paper. Figure 4, Panel A, shows that about half of all observations confirm the pos-
itive association between Asymmetry and CoE (n=16; 57%), four observations (14%) 
tend to reject it, and eight observations (29%) provide mixed/conditional results. In par-
ticular, the level of market competition appears to be an important conditioning variable 
in empirical settings, given that Asymmetry effects tend to vanish as markets become 
more competitive (e.g., Akins, Jeffrey, and Verdi (2012), Armstrong, Core, Taylor, and 
Verrecchia (2011), and Luong, Nguyen, and Yin (2011)). Furthermore, findings in 
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Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) and Kang (2010) indicate the existence of January-
effects. 
 
(Figure 4 about here) 
5.3.1 Measurement of Cost of Equity 
Sub-sampling observations according to CoE measurement reveals some interesting 
points (see Figure 4, Panel B and C). First, the literature mainly uses realized returns to 
proxy for firms’ CoE (REAL: 21; 75%), with seven observations (25%) relying on 
VMB estimates, and none using traditional RFB ones. The fact that risk factor-based 
models (such as the CAPM) derive from the assumption of homogenous expectations 
between investor groups and hence, by definition “there is no role for accounting to 
reduce the information asymmetry” (Shevlin, 2013, p. 466), seems to justify the non-
representation of RFB proxies in extant studies. Second—and more importantly—there 
is notable variation in the conclusions reached by REAL studies (reject: 14%; mixed: 
38%; confirm: 48%), but findings are rather uniform when VMB proxies are used (re-
ject: 14%; confirm: 86%). This suggests that researchers’ choice of CoE measurement 
impacts the conclusions reached regarding the CoE effects of Asymmetry in that VMB 
studies generally confirm H3, while REAL studies are more likely to reject it.  
Given that realized returns tend to be noisy proxies of CoE (Chen et al. (2013), 
Fama and French, 1997, and Vuolteenaho (2002)), one might argue that greater weight 
should be placed on studies applying VMB (i.e., implied cost of capital) estimates. In 
other words, the reason why “only” 48 percent of REAL studies confirm the positive 
association between Asymmetry and CoE might stem from imprecise CoE estimates, 
which leads to low power tests (e.g. Wang (2015)). While convincing evidence exists 
that VMB proxies show greater validity than realized return-based proxies (e.g., 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et al. (2011), and Lee et al. (2010, 2015)), those 
estimates are not impeccable either. Beyond the issue of lacking estimates for young, 
small and financially-distressed firms due to coverage bias by analysts (e.g., Diether, 
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), and La Porta (1996)), it is 
the problem of upward-biased implied cost of capital (ICC) estimates—due to optimis-
tic analyst forecasts (e.g., Dugar and Nathan (1995), Francis and Philbrick (1993), and 
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McNichols and O'Brien (1997))—which raises particular concerns. For example, 
Hwang et al. (2013) conclude that “as long as the [ICC] estimates are derived from ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts, potential measurement errors in [ICC] estimates could remain 
and influence […] findings.” Therefore, the authors call for “more efforts to fine-tune 
[ICC] measures” (p. 165). Model-based ICC estimates might be one remedy to over-
come these analyst-related deficiencies in future work (e.g., Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang 
(2012), and Li and Mohanram (2014)).  
5.3.2 Measurement of Information Asymmetry 
As most studies in my sample rely on market microstructure-based proxies to measure 
information asymmetry (n=24; 86%), I concentrate subsequent analyses on this subset 
of observations. Figure 5 shows that PIN scores are most widely used (17; 71%) in the 
literature, followed by bid/ask spreads operated in some studies (7; 29%). None of the 
spread-based studies reject the direct link between Asymmetry and CoE (Figure 5, Panel 
C) which suggests that higher bid/ask spreads indicate greater information asymmetry 
and can induce higher CoE. In contrast, the association between PIN scores and CoE is 
somewhat debated (reject: 24%, mixed: 18%, confirm: 59%): Mohanram and Rajgopal 
(2009, p. 241) conclude that “there is not much evidence [that] PIN is a source of priced 
information risk” and Duarte and Young (2009) argue that it is the illiquidity compo-
nent of PIN which explains the positive relation with CoE, and not the Asymmetry part 
of it. However, the majority of studies in my sample confirm the negative CoE effects 
arising from asymmetric information (Figure 5, Panel B). Together with new evidence 
from longer sampling periods (e.g., Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2011), and 
Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2016)) and improved estimation techniques (e.g., 
Easley, López de Prado, and O'Hara (2012), and Hwang, Lee, Lim, and Park (2013)), 
this substantiates the proposition of PIN being an important driver of CoE.24  
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
                                                 
24  See also Boehmer, Grammig, and Theissen (2007), Yan and Zhang (2012), and William Lin and Ke 
(2011) for a discussion on how to improve PIN score measurement.       
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5.3.3 Summary of Results   
Figure 6 summarizes key results from the analysis of information asymmetry with CoE 
and shows that evidence is strongest for VMB proxies and bid-ask spreads, but some-
what mixed for REAL proxies and PIN scores. Overall, the majority of studies find a 
positive Asymmetry-CoE relation which corroborates the conjecture of informational 
disparity between investor groups causing an increase in firms’ CoE (confirming H3). 
However, recent analytical and empirical evidence demonstrates that high levels of 
market competition tend to subdue these Asymmetry effects. Specifically, Akins et al. 
(2012), Armstrong et al. (2011) and Luong et al. (2011) show that—consistent with the 
analytical model of Lambert et al. (2012)—the significance of Asymmetry on CoE de-
clines as market competition increases; that is, in perfectly liquid markets, in which both 
informed and uninformed investors act as price takers, asymmetric information has no 
material effect on firms’ CoE. These findings put forward market competition as an 
important conditioning variable in future research.25 
 
(Figure 6 about here) 
5.4 Additional Analysis  
To address concerns of publication bias (Møller & Jennions, 2001), I test for differences 
in meta-analytic results between higher-tier and lower-tier journals. Table 11 reports 
findings for the link between Quantity and CoE and shows that there is no clear pattern 
regarding the differences in average effect sizes between the two groups: higher-tier 
journals report a stronger effect size when RFB/VMB proxies are being used (high:  
-0.081; low: -0.055), while lower-tier journals report a stronger effect size for REAL 
proxies (-0.020; -0.158). Similarly, higher-tier studies find stronger CoE effects for fi-
nancial disclosure (-0.119; -0.044), while lower-tier studies report a stronger relation 
with partial-financial disclosure (-0.038; -0.138)—average effect sizes for non-financial 
disclosure are alike (-0.061; -0.040). Comparable patterns are observed for the link be-
tween Precision and CoE (see Table 12). For instance, when measuring CoE by 
                                                 
25  Common proxies for market competition include: investor concentration (Akins et al., 2012), institu-
tional ownership (Luong et al., 2011) and number of shareholders (Armstrong et al. (2011), Barron et 
al. (2012)).  
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RFB/VMB proxies, total average affect size is larger in higher-tier journals (r̅: -0.097) 
than in lower-tier ones (-0.067); in contrast, when focusing on realized return-based 
studies, total average effect size is larger for lower-tier (-0.019) vis-à-vis higher-tier 
publications (-0.014). However, for both links results in higher-tier journals are slightly 
more heterogenous than in lower-tier ones—which can be inferred from more signifi-
cant chi-squares, lower Se
2 Sr
2⁄  ratios and wider confidence intervals—indicating that the 
CoE effects of Quantity and Precision are discussed more controversially in higher-tier 
outlets. 
As a further robustness test, I follow Ahmed, Chalmers, and Khlif (2013) and cal-
culate for all significant results a “fail-safe” N statistic that estimates the number of un-
published studies reporting null results required to reduce the mean effect size to a spec-
ified criterion.26 In particular, I am examining how many studies are necessary to reduce 
observed effect sizes from the meta-analyses to a hypothetical effect size of just below 
zero. Using a criterion of -0.01, it requires approximately 40 studies to revert the nega-
tive association between financial disclosure and CoE and about 73 studies to change 
the overall negative relation between Precision and VMB/RFB proxies, with 23 (18) 
studies needed to alter results when Analyst (non-AQ) proxies are being used. Taken 
together, these additional tests suggest that my main findings tend to be free of publica-
tion bias and unaffected by the file drawer problem.  
 
(Table 11 about here) 
 
(Table 12 about here) 
6 Discussion of Results and Conclusion 
This paper provides a quantitative review of the literature examining the effect of idio-
syncratic information on firms’ CoE capital. For the links of Quantity and Precision 
with CoE I report meta-analytic results, and for the link with Asymmetry I provide de-
                                                 
26  The fail-safe N statistic is calculated as: 𝐾0 = 𝐾 [ 
?̅?𝑘
?̅?0
− 1] where 𝐾0 is the number of unpublished 
studies required to affect conclusion reached (i.e., fail-safe N), 𝐾 is the total number of studies includ-
ed in the meta-analysis, ?̅?𝑘 is the reported mean effect size, ?̅?0 is the criterion effect size specified by 
the research (Orwin, 1983). 
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scriptive statistics only due to data constraints. In total, I review the results of 113 
unique papers and my findings suggest that the association between firm-specific in-
formation and CoE is subject to moderate effects as indicated by insignificant average 
effect sizes (Quantity: -0.066 ± 0.124; Precision: -0.048 ± 0.095), and a notable number 
of studies (29%) that only find conditional results for the link between Asymmetry and 
CoE.  
The empirical measurement of both CoE and information attributes partially ex-
plains these mixed results. First, findings for the link between Quantity and CoE depend 
on disclosure type (financial vs. partial-/non-financial) and disclosure settings insofar as 
firms in comparatively weakly regulated countries tend to enjoy two to four times great-
er CoE benefits from more expansive disclosure—depending on the type of disclo-
sure—than firms in highly regulated countries such as the US or the UK. Second, the 
conjectured negative relationship between Precision and CoE is only significant in stud-
ies using analyst-based and non-accrual quality proxies for Precision and RFB/VMB 
proxies for CoE. That is, the link between information precision and CoE seems trivial 
in asset pricing tests (REAL proxies) or when accrual quality metrics are used. Third, 
almost all VMB studies confirm the positive association between Asymmetry and CoE 
(86%), but there is notable variation in the conclusions reached by REAL studies (re-
ject: 14%; mixed: 38%; confirm: 48%).  
 
Impact of Endogeneity. Endogeneity is a major challenge in the extant literature (e.g., 
Core (2001)) and offers an alternative explanation for mixed meta-analytic findings. In 
particular, simultaneity and reverse causality creates difficulties when examining the 
theoretically negative relation between Quantity/Precision and CoE: firms disclose 
more or better information to lower their CoE (i.e., negative correlation), but only firms 
with high CoE decide to do so (i.e., positive correlation). Hence, endogeneity can lead 
to an insignificant relation between information quality and firms’ CoE (e.g., 
Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist (2014)). To this extent, the insignificance 
of some results might be explained by the fact that data used in the meta-analyses are 
typically from correlation matrices and, therefore, not incorporating methods used by 
the studies in my sample to address endogeneity.  
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CoE Measurement. VMB measures are most frequently used in the literature (e.g., 60 
percent of all 138 observations use such proxies in my sample), followed by asset pric-
ing tests and realized returns (REAL) in second place (31%) and RFB estimates in third 
(9%). Extant findings, therefore, hinge on the validity of the CoE measures applied: 
results are only as valid as the proxies used to attain them. In other words, the common-
ly found negative relationship between higher information quality and VMB proxies 
might be a spurious one (i.e., better information may “simply” reduce optimism in ana-
lyst forecasts which lowers VMB estimates mechanically) and noise in realized returns 
may explain the generally insignificant relationship in REAL studies (e.g., McInnis 
(2010), and Ogneva (2012)).  
These issues of CoE measurement raise the question of how to weigh existing ev-
idence. Given that valuation model-based estimates tend to be more valid measures of 
CoE than realized return-based proxies (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Botosan et 
al. (2011), and Lee et al. (2010, 2015)), one might place greater weight on the conclu-
sions reached in VMB studies: firms with better corporate information environments are 
likely to enjoy lower CoE than otherwise identical firms. However, analyst-based ICC 
estimates tend to be upward-biased, leading to distorted results (e.g., Easton and 
Monahan (2005, 2016), and Easton and Sommers (2007)). Moreover, young, small and 
financially-distressed firms are rarely covered by security analysts (e.g., Diether et al. 
(2002), Hong et al. (2000), and La Porta (1996)), biasing ICC samples towards larger 
and more established firms. 
While analyst forecast bias can be corrected for (e.g., Guay, Kothari, and Shu 
(2011), Larocque (2013), and Mohanram and Gode (2013)), the problem of sampling 
bias remains in analyst-based ICC studies. This poses a trade-off for researchers to use 
either a less representative sample with more valid CoE proxies (VMB) or a more rep-
resentative sample with less valid return estimates (REAL). To this extent, VMB find-
ings are not necessarily generalizable towards smaller and younger firms, and REAL 
study results may be confounded by cash-flow and discount-rate news. Recent ad-
vancements in model-based ICC estimates might help overcome this predicament in 
future work because these estimates are analyst-independent—removing forecast bias—
and calculated from firms’ current accounting information only, thus ensuring repre-
sentative samples (e.g., Hou et al. (2012), and Li and Mohanram (2014)).  
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Information Quality Measurement. The literature uses several different proxies for 
firms’ information attributes and results vary depending on which proxy is used (e.g., 
AQ vs. non-AQ; PIN vs. SPREAD-based studies). However, even when identical in-
formation proxies are applied, disagreement in the literature remains (see, for example, 
Core et al. (2008) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) for a discussion on the pricing of 
accrual quality and PIN scores). Measurement error in the proxies for Precision, Asym-
metry and Quantity might cause these inconsistent results and one way to address it is to 
improve the empirical soundness of the respective proxies (e.g., McNichols (2002) AQ 
metric modification of the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Brown and Hillegeist (2007) 
and Hwang et al. (2013) PIN score modification of the Easley et al. (1996, 1997) mod-
el). However, despite such improvements, no single proxy can be entirely free of meas-
urement error. Thus, another approach to deal with this errors-in-variable problem is to 
operationalize more elaborate research designs. In this respect, further work along the 
lines of Verdi (2005), who uses principal component analysis to control for noise in 
information proxies, seems beneficial to increase empirical robustness of results.  
 
General Implications of Findings. Extant evidence is (yet) insufficient to support idio-
syncratic information as a separate risk factor in asset pricing models (i.e., rigorous as-
set pricing test as in Core et al. (2008) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) tend to re-
fute the possibility of an information risk factor). However, evidence is ample enough to 
confirm the hypothesis of better information quality leading to lower CoE (e.g., Core et 
al. (2008) themselves find that better accrual quality leads to lower market beta which is 
equal to lower CoE). While at first glance an antithesis, this conclusion is consistent 
with economic theory that corroborates a negative relationship between idiosyncratic 
information and CoE, but questions if it impacts CoE directly (e.g., Easley and O'Hara 
(2004), and Lambert et al. (2012)) or only indirectly through other risk factors such as 
market beta (e.g., Hughes et al. (2007), and Lambert et al. (2007)). My findings also 
suggest important implications for practice: firms can lower their CoE if they release 
more value-relevant information to investors (e.g., committing to more expansive dis-
closure), provide information of higher precision (e.g., following stricter reporting 
standards), and disseminate information more widely between investor groups (e.g., 
promoting investor relations). However, these benefits are likely to be attenuated in 
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countries where strong regulation and transparency requirements establish ex ante high 
quality corporate information environments.  
It should also be noted that the extant literature is silent on the relative importance 
of Precision, Asymmetry and Quantity as determinates of firms’ CoE; that is, which of 
the three attributes has comparatively greater CoE relevance remains unanswered by 
current studies. Therefore, to resolve the debate about the market pricing of idiosyncrat-
ic information empirically, it seems necessary to extend prevailing research designs—
which examine the impact of one information proxy on one CoE proxy at a time—
towards a comprehensive methodology that allows for simultaneously examining the 
different information attributes and CoE measures within one empirical model. Such an 
approach might help disentangle the underlying complexity between idiosyncratic in-
formation and firms’ CoE. A first promising step in this direction has been taken by 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012). 
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Appendix: Journal Index   
Journal Abbreviation ABS 2015 
Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review ATBMR n/a 
Accounting in Europe AIE 2 
Accounting Review TAR 4 
Accounting, Organizations and Society AOS 4 
Advanced Science Letters ASL n/a 
Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting AIA 2 
Applied Economics AE 2 
Asian Journal of Business and Accounting AJBA n/a 
Asian Review of Accounting ARA 2 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics APJAE 2 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies APJFS n/a 
Australian Accounting Review AAR 2 
Australian Journal of Management AJM n/a 
Business Research BR n/a 
China Finance Review International CFRI 1 
Contemporary Accounting Research CAR 4 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management CSREM 1 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade EMFT n/a 
European Accounting Review EAR 3 
European Management Journal EMJ 2 
Global Journal of Business Research GJBR n/a 
Industrial Management and Data Systems IMDS 2 
International Business Review IBR 3 
International Journal of Accounting IJA 3 
International Journal of Forecasting IJF 3 
International Review of Economics and Finance IREF 2 
International Review of Financial Analysis IRFA 3 
Journal of Accounting and Economics JAE 4 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy JAPP 3 
Journal of Accounting Research JAR 4 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance JAAF 3 
Journal of Applied Accounting Research JAAR 2 
Journal of Banking and Finance JBF 3 
Journal of Business JB n/a 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting JBFA 3 
Journal of Business, Economics and Finance JBEF n/a 
Journal of Corporate Finance JCF 4 
Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science JEFA n/a 
Journal of Empirical Finance JEF 3 
Table continued next page.  
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Journal Index (cont.) 
Journal Abbreviation ABS 2015 
Journal of Finance JF 4 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis JFQA 4 
Journal of Financial Economics JFE 4 
Journal of Intellectual Capital JIC 2 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money JIFMIM 3 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management JMFM 2 
Journal of Risk and Insurance JRI 3 
Management Decision MD 2 
Management Science MS 4 
Management Science and Engineering MSE n/a 
Managerial and Decision Economics MDE 2 
Managerial Finance MF 1 
North American Journal of Economics and Finance NAJEF 2 
Pacific Accounting Review PAR 1 
Quarterly Journal of Finance QJF 1 
Review of Accounting and Finance RAF 2 
Review of Accounting Studies RAST 4 
Review of Finance (European Finance Review) RF 4 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting RQFA 3 
SSRN SSRN n/a 
Notes: Journals in bold are categorised as high-tier journals in this study. Ranking follows the Academic Journal 
Guide 2015 (ABS).   
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Table 1: Attributes and Keywords 
Attributes Keywords  
Information Quantity  information quantity/amount 
 information/estimation risk 
 mandatory/voluntary disclosure  
 financial/non-financial disclosure  
 age/listing/operating history  
 media/press coverage  
 firm/company prominence 
Information Precision  information precision/accuracy/quality 
 financial reporting quality  
 accounting quality 
 earnings quality/management 
 earnings attributes 
 accrual quality 
 analyst forecast  
 security analyst  
 analyst forecast precision/accuracy/dispersion 
 earnings/analyst characteristic 
 earnings persistence/predictability/smoothness/value rele-
vance/timeliness/conservatism 
Information Asymmetry  information asymmetry/dissemination/dispersion  
 informational dis/advantages  
 un/informed investor  
 public/private information  
 probability of informed trading/PIN 
 bid-ask spread  
 investor concentration/competition  
 market liquidity  
 firm-specific information 
 idiosyncratic information 
Cost of Equity   cost of equity 
 cost of capital 
 implied cost of capital 
 expected rate of return 
 required rate of return 
 discount rate 
 weighted cost of capital 
The table shows for each information attribute (and cost of equity) the respective keywords searched for in several 
databases and journals.    
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Table 2: Information Quantity on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis 
Study Journal* Country† US?† 
Disc. 
Env.€ 
Disc. 
Reg. 
Score$ 
No. of 
firms§ 
No. of 
firm-
years‡ 
Sampling 
Period 
DV: 
CoE¥ 
IV: 
Quantity£ 
Disc. 
Type£ 
Disc. 
Metric£  
Direct 
Link? 
Effect size 
(Pearson's 
r coeffi-
cient) 
Source of 
Information 
Al Guindy (2016) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 1,232 8,626 2007-2013 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0870 Table 5, p. 30 
Al Guindy (2016) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 54 381 2007-2013 VMB Disc. FF Dummy Confirm -0.1008 Table 6, p. 31 
Al-Hadi, Taylor, and Hossain 
(2015) 
JMFM 6 Count. N LDE n/a 141 705 2007-2011 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0160 Table 2, p. 80 
Bachoo et al. (2013) AAR AUS N LDE 0.75 150 450 2003-2005 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0157 Table 3, p. 78 
Baginski and Rakow (2012) RAST US Y HDE 1.00 1,355 1,355 2004 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.1164 Table 4, p. 299 
Blanco, Garcia Lara, and Tribo 
(2015) 
JBFA US Y HDE 1.00 1,667 10,002 2001-2006 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.1281 Table 6, p. 391 
Blanco et al. (2015) JBFA US Y HDE 1.00 1,667 8,502b 2001-2006 REAL Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0314 Table 10, p. 398 
Botosan (1997) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 122 122 1990 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.1430 Table 7, p. 342 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) JAR US Y HDE 1.00 246 2,706 1986-1996 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed 0.0110 Table 4, p. 34 
Boujelbene and Affes (2013) JEFA FR N LDE 0.75 102 102 2009 RFB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.2180 Table 4, p. 50 
Campbell et al. (2014) RAST US Y HDE 1.00 2,048 8,193 2005-2008 REAL Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0292 Table 8, p. 436 
Cao et al. (2017) RAST 31 Count. B n/a 0.84 6,309 37,856 2004-2009 VMB Disc. FF Dummy Confirm -0.1500 Table 2, p. 14 
Chen, Wei, and Chen (2003) SSRN 9 Count. N LDE 0.87 273 545 2000-2001 VMB Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1400 Table 6, p. 391 
Cheng et al. (2006) RQFA US Y HDE 1.00 348 348 2001-2002 VMB Disc. FF EXI Confirm -0.0500 Table 2, p. 193 
Chien and Lu (2015) IMDS US Y HDE 1.00 4,122 16,488 2009-2012 RFB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0090 Table 4, p. 515 
Clarkson et al. (2013) JAPP US Y HDE 1.00 98 195 2003, 2006 VMB Disc. NF SCI Reject 0.1096 Table 4. p. 423 
Core et al. (2015) EAR 35 Count. B n/a 0.86 3,347 50,201 1990-2004 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0083 Table 3, p. 14 
Core et al. (2015) EAR 35 Count. B n/a 0.86 3,347 50,201 1990-2004 REAL Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0030 Table 4, p. 18 
Déjean and Martinez (2009) AIE FR N LDE 0.75 112 112 2006 RFB Disc. NF SCI Reject 0.1450 Table 5, p. 73 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 795 11,925 1993-2007 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Mixed -0.0297 Table 4, p. 76 
Dhaliwal et al. (2014) JAPP 31 Count. B n/a 0.83 6,093 79,212 1995-2007 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0700 Table 3, p. 341 
Elzahar, Hussainey, Mazzi, and 
Tsalavoutas (2015) 
IRFA UK N HDE 0.83 90 448 2006-2010 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.1695 Table 7, p. 106 
Elzahar et al. (2015)  IRFA UK N HDE 0.83 90 448 2006-2010 VMB Disc. NF SCI Reject -0.0378 Table 7, p. 106 
Embong, Mohd‐ Saleh, and 
Hassan (2012) 
ARA MY N LDE 0.92 135 406 2004-2006 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed -0.1430 Table 2, p. 126 
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Table 2: Information Quantity on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis (cont.) 
Study Journal* Country† US?† 
Disc. 
Env.€ 
Disc. 
Reg. 
Score$ 
No. of 
firms§ 
No. of 
firm-
years‡ 
Sampling 
Period 
DV: 
CoE¥ 
IV: 
Quantity£ 
Disc. 
Type£ 
Disc. 
Metric£  
Direct 
Link? 
Effect size 
(Pearson's 
r coeffi-
cient) 
Source of 
Information 
Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) JBFA SP N LDE 0.50 50 250 1998-2002 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed -0.2000 Table 4, p. 1384 
Eugster (2014) SSRN CH N LDE 0.67 104 1,039 1999-2008 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed -0.2260 Table 4, p. 40 
Evans (2016) CAR US Y HDE 1.00 187 935 2003-2007 VMB Disc. FF SCI Mixed 0.0440 Table 1, pp.1147-8 
Feng, Li, and Gu (2009) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 335 4,024 1995-2006 VMB Disc. FF SCI Mixed -0.0343 Table 4, pp. 30-1 
Francis, Khurana, et al. (2005) TAR 23 Count. N n/a 0.69 137 274 1991, 1993 VMB Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1450 Table 7, p. 1154 
Francis et al. (2008) JAR US Y HDE 1.00 677 677 2001 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed -0.0381 Table 4, p. 79 
Fu et al. (2012) JAE US Y HDE 1.00 333 7,654 1951-1973 REAL Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0600 Table 3, p. 139 
Fu et al. (2012) JAE US Y HDE 1.00 333 7,654 1951-1973 RFB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0500 Table 3, p. 139 
García-Sánchez and Noguera-
Gámez (2017) 
IBR 27 Count. B n/a 0.72 659 3,294 2009-2013 VMB Disc. PF Dummy Confirm -0.0620 Table 5, p. 965 
Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) JBFA UK N HDE 0.83 30 301 1993-2002 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed -0.1340 Table 2c, p. 625 
Grüning (2011) BR DE N LDE 0.42 361 361 2006 REAL Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1580 Table 4, p. 58 
Hail (2002) EAR CH N LDE 0.67 73 73 1997 VMB Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.4780 Table 5, p. 761 
Healy et al. (1999) CAR US Y HDE 1.00 37 408 1980-1990 REAL Disc. PF EXI Confirm -0.1034 Table 6, p. 504 
Khlif, Samaha, and Azzam 
(2015) 
JAAR EG N LDE 0.50 73 292 2006-2009 RFB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.2730 Table 4, p. 44 
Kim and Shi (2011) JAPP US Y HDE 1.00 1,066 3,198 2003-2005 VMB Disc. FF Dummy Mixed 0.0148 Table 5, p. 360 
Kothari et al. (2009) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 223 1,338a 1996-2001 RFB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0313 Table 3, p. 1658 
Kristandl and Bontis (2007) JIC 4 Count. N LDE 0.46 95 95 2004 VMB Disc. PF SCI Mixed 0.0315 Table 6, p. 587 
La Rosa and Liberatore (2014) EMJ 8 Count. N n/a 0.60 62 309 2005-2009 VMB Disc. PF SCI Reject 0.0560 Table 10, p. 816 
Lopes and de Alencar (2010) IJA BR N LDE 0.25 55 276 1998, 2000/02/04/05 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.2900 Table 3, p. 454 
Mangena et al. (2016) JAAF UK N HDE 0.83 125 125 2004 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.2500 Table 3, p. 12 
Mangena et al. (2016) JAAF UK N HDE 0.83 125 125 2004 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.3440 Table 3, p. 12 
Ng and Rezaee (2015) JCF Global B n/a n/a 598 13,745 1991-2013 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0300 Table 3, pp. 138-9 
Ogneva et al. (2007) TAR US Y HDE 1.00 2,021 2,021 2004 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Reject 0.0127 Table 2, pp.1268-9 
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Table 2: Information Quantity on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis (cont.) 
Study Journal* Country† US?† 
Disc. 
Env.€ 
Disc. 
Reg. 
Score$ 
No. of 
firms§ 
No. of 
firm-
years‡ 
Sampling 
Period 
DV: 
CoE¥ 
IV: 
Quantity£ 
Disc. 
Type£ 
Disc. 
Metric£  
Direct 
Link? 
Effect size 
(Pearson's 
r coeffi-
cient) 
Source of 
Information 
Orens, Aerts, and Lybaert 
(2009) 
MD 4 Count. N LDE 0.55 223 223 2002 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.1313 Table 4, pp.1547-8 
Orens, Aerts, and Cormier 
(2010) 
JBFA 7 Count. B n/a 0.84 668 668 2002 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.2720 Table 5, p. 1076 
Orens, Aerts, and Lybaert 
(2013) 
RAF 4 Count. N LDE 0.52 217 217 2002 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.1150 Table 4, p. 139 
Paugam and Ramond (2015) JBFA FR N LDE 0.75 445 445 2009 VMB Disc. FF SCI Confirm -0.1112 Table 4, p. 606 
Plumlee et al. (2015) JAPP US Y HDE 1.00 79 474 2000-2005 VMB Disc. NF SCI Confirm -0.0150 Table 3, p. 351 
Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) MDE Global B n/a n/a 27 135 1995-1999 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.3410 Table 4, p. 438 
Reverte (2012) CSREM SP N LDE 0.50 19 114 2003-2008 VMB Disc. NF EXI Confirm -0.2388 Table 4, p. 263 
Richardson and Welker (2001) AOS CA N HDE 0.92 108 324 1990-1992 VMB Disc. FF EXI Confirm -0.0460 Table 2, p. 604 
Richardson and Welker (2001) AOS CA N HDE 0.92 108 324 1990-1992 VMB Disc. NF EXI Reject 0.0110 Table 2, p. 604 
Saini and Herrmann (2012) SSRN US Y HDE 1.00 87 87 2005 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.0770 Table 2, p. 42 
Tohang and Hutagaol-
Martowidjojo (2015) 
ASL ID N LDE 0.50 29 58 2010-2011 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.2210 Table 2, p. 901 
Wu et al. (2014) EMFT TW N LDE 0.75 121 482 2007-2010 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.0930 Table 3, p. 113 
Xiao-feng, Wei-ling, and Ming-
yi (2006) 
MSE CH N LDE 0.67 102 102 2005 VMB Disc. PF SCI Confirm -0.5200 Table 4, p. 1449 
Xu (2009) GJBR US Y HDE 1.00 212 212 1996 VMB Disc. PF EXI Mixed -0.0300 Table 3, p. 21 
Zhao, Davis, and Berry (2009) RAF US Y HDE 1.00 255 255 2000 VMB Disc. NF Dummy Confirm -0.1529 Table 9, p. 274 
Notes:* Journal names along with their ABS 2015 ranking are shown in the appendix. † AU: Australia; BR: Brazil; CH: Switzerland; CA: Canada: DE: Germany; EG: Egypt; FR: France; ID: 
Indonesia; MY: Malaysia; SP: Spain; TW: Taiwan; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States; Studies focusing on US firms only are denoted (Y), non-US studies (N) and studies using insepara-
bly both US and non-US firms in their sample (B). $ Disc. Reg.: Disclosure regulation score from La Porta et al. (2006); in the case of multi-country studies scores are a weighted average by 
number of firm-years per country. § Number of firms is approximated as number of firm-years divided by number of sample years. ‡ When multiple samples are selected for one study, average 
sample size is reported.  ¥ REAL: realised-return, RFB: risk factor-based, VMB: valuation model-based cost of equity proxy. £ Disc.: Disclosure; Disclosure Types: Full-financial (FF), part-
financial (PF), non-financial (NF) disclosure; Disclosure Metrics: Self-constructed index (SCI), external third-party index (EXI), binary dummy variable (Dummy).    a Converted firm-quarters 
into firm-years. b Converted firm-months into firm-years. 
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Table 3: Information Precision on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis 
Study Journal* Country† 
No. of 
firms§ 
No. of firm-
years‡ 
Sampling 
Period 
DV: 
CoE¥ 
IV: Preci-
sion£ 
Direct 
Link? 
Effect size 
(Pearson's r 
coefficient) 
Source of 
Information 
Artiach and Clarkson (2014) AJM US 196 3,138 1985-2000 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0593 Table 3, p. 305 
Barron et al. (2012) SSRN US 307 8,606a 1983-2010 VMB Analyst Confirm -0.2327 Table 2, p. 29 
Barth et al. (2013) JAE US 1,985 51,612 1974–2000 RFB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1210 Table 1, p. 214 
Barth et al. (2013) JAE US 1,985 51,612 1974–2000 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0380 Table 1, p. 214 
Berger, Chen, and Li (2012) SSRN US 1,665 41,615 1980-2004 RFB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0475 Table 7, p. 33 
Berger et al. (2012) SSRN US 1,015 25,365 1980-2004 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0830 Table 5, p. 29 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1,054 12,648 1993-2005 RFB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1770 In-text, p. 475 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1,054 12,648 1993-2005 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.2243 Table 2, p. 463 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013) JBFA US 555 6,656 1993-2004 VMB Analyst Mixed -0.1470 Table 3, p. 1061 
Botosan et al. (2004) RAST US 312 2,804 1993-2001 VMB Analyst Mixed -0.0930 Table 2, p. 247 
Callen, Khan, and Lu (2013) CAR US 1,129 29,345 1981-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0354 Table 5 & 6, pp. 283-85 
Callen et al. (2013) CAR US 841 19,336 1984-2006 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0416 Table 7, p. 287 
Chan, Lin, and Strong (2009) MF UK 416 5,403 1987-1999 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0190 Table 3, p. 336 
Chan et al. (2009) MF UK 416 5,403 1987-1999 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0288 Table 9, p. 342 
Chan, Lo, and Yang (2016) NAJEF US 1,828 32,910 1996-2013 RFB Analyst Confirm -0.1203 Table 4, p.125 
Chen, Dhaliwal, and Trombley (2008) JAAF US 2,122 53,048 1980-2004 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0420 Table 2, p. 480 
Chen et al. (2008) JAAF US 614 15,339 1980-2004 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0433 Table 4, p. 489 
Cohen (2003) SSRN US 1,111 16,664 1987-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0045 Table 6 & 8, pp. 44-6 
Cohen (2008) APJAE US 1,074 18,264 1987−2003 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0068 Table 3, p. 83 
Cohen (2008) APJAE US 1,074 18,264 1987−2003 RFB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0052 Table 4, p. 85 
Core et al. (2008) JAE US 2,909 93,093 1970-2001 REAL Acc.Qual. Reject 0.0003 Table 4 & 5, pp. 11-3 
Core et al. (2008) JAE US 814 21,979 1975-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0386 Table 8, p. 18 
Diether et al. (2002) JF US 2,908 66,884 1980-2002 REAL Analyst Reject 0.0089 Table 9, p. 2136 
Diether et al. (2002) JFQA US 1,203 22,854 1983-2001 REAL Analyst Confirm -0.0585 Table 8, p. 597 
Eliwa, Haslam, and Abraham (2016) IRFA UK 587 4,112 2005–2011 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0714 Table 1, p. 131 
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Table 3: Information Precision on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis (cont) 
Study Journal* Country† 
No. of 
firms§ 
No. of firm-
years‡ 
Sampling 
Period 
DV: 
CoE¥ 
IV: Preci-
sion£ 
Direct 
Link? 
Effect size 
(Pearson's r 
coefficient) 
Source of 
Information 
Francis et al. (2004) TAR US 790 21,334 1975-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0481 Table 5, 6 & 9, pp. 990-1001 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 
(2005a) 
JAE US 1,722 55,092 1970-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0248 Table 2, p. 309 
Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva 
(2011) 
RAST US 1,875 54,389 1975-2003 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0139 Table 4 & 6, pp. 261-4 
Gray, Koh, and Tong (2009) JBFA AU 170 1,362 1998-2005 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0676 Table 3, p. 63 
Gray et al. (2009) JBFA AU 170 1,362 1998-2005 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0730 Table 4 & 5, pp. 66-8 
Hou (2015) RAST US 1,418 41,134 1982-2010 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1275 Table 2, p. 1073 
Hwang and Lim (2012) APJFS US 645 9,672 1993-2007 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1640 Table 2, p. 471 
Kim and Qi (2010) TAR US 2,802 103,682 1970-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0040 Table 4, pp. 947-9 
Kim and Sohn (2013) JAPP US 1,211 30,276 1987-2011 VMB  Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0673 Table 2, p. 529 
Konchitchki et al. (2016) RAST US 2,567 100,095 1976-2014 REAL Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0118 Table 5, p. 21 
Larson and Resutek (2015) SSRN US 79 2,684 1978-2011 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0491 Table 6 & 8, p. 42-4 
Larson and Resutek (2015) SSRN US 49 1,728 1977-2011 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.1102 Table 9, p. 45 
Latiff and Taib (2011) ATBMR MY 141 141 2004 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.1624 Table 4, p. 6 
Liu and Wysocki (2016) QJF US 1,454 68,348 1960-2006 RFB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.1200 Table 3, p. 15 
Liu and Wysocki (2016) QJF US 945 44,392 1960-2006 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0700 Table 3, p. 15 
Mashruwala and Mashruwala (2011) TAR US 2,561 92,187 1971-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0048 Table 6, p. 1368 
McInnis (2010) TAR US 1,777 56,870b 1975-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0025 Table 1, p. 321 
McInnis (2010) TAR US 438 14,008 1975-2001 VMB Acc.Qual. Reject -0.0444 Table 4, p. 328 
Ogneva (2012) TAR US 2,184 80,790 1970-2006 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0048 Table 4, pp. 1433-4 
Othman (2012) AJBA MY 461 3,688 2000-2007 VMB Acc.Qual. Confirm -0.0319 Table 3, p. 17 
Safdar and Yan (2016) CFRI CN 1,251 8,754 2006-2012 VMB Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0244 Table 2, p. 87 
Safdar and Yan (2016) CFRI CN 1,251 8,754 2006-2012 REAL Acc.Qual. Mixed -0.0138 Table 3, 5, & 6, p. 89-92 
Sheng and Thevenot (2015) IJF US 128 3,583a 1984-2011 VMB Analyst Confirm -0.3300 Table 2, p. 521 
Notes:* Journal names along with their ABS 2015 ranking are shown in the appendix. † AU: Australia; CN: China; MY: Malaysia; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States. § Number of firms is 
approximated as number of firm-years divided by number of sample years. ‡ When multiple samples are selected for one study, average sample size is reported.  ¥ REAL: realised-return, RFB: 
risk factor-based, VMB: valuation model-based cost of equity proxy. £Acc.Qual: Accounting/Earnings Quality, Analyst: security analyst forecast based proxy. a Converted firm-quarters into 
firm-years. b Converted firm-months into firm-years.  
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Table 4: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Analysis 
Study Journal* Country† 
Sampling 
Period DV: CoE¥ IV: Asymmetry£ Proxy‡ Direct Link? 
Source of 
Information§ 
Akins et al. (2012) TAR US 1984-2009 REAL Micro. B/A Mixed Table 3, p. 48 
Akins et al. (2012) TAR US 1984-2005 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 4, p. 50 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) JFE US 1961-1980 REAL Micro. B/A Confirm Table 3, p. 236 
Armstrong et al. (2011) JAR US 1988-2006 REAL Micro. B/A Mixed Table 3 & 4, pp. 23-8 
Armstrong et al. (2011) JAR US 1976-2006 REAL Non-Micro. Acc.Qual. Mixed Table 3 & 4, pp. 23-8 
Armstrong et al. (2011) JAR US 1976-2006 REAL Non-Micro. Analyst Mixed Table 3 & 4, pp. 23-8 
Aslan et al. (2011) JEF US 1965-2009 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 8, p. 796 
Barron et al. (2012) SSRN US 1983-2010 VMB Non-Micro. Analyst Confirm Table 4, p. 32-4 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1993-2005 VMB Micro. B/A Confirm Table 2, p. 463 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) TAR US 1993-2005 VMB Micro. PIN Confirm Table 2, p. 463 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013) JBFA US 1993-2004 VMB Micro. PIN Confirm Table 4, p. 1062 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013) JBFA US 1993-2004 REAL Micro. PIN Reject Table 4, p. 1062 
Brennan et al. (2016) MS US 1983-2010 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 4 & 5, pp. 2469-70 
Choi, Jin, and Yan (2016) SSRN CN 1996-2007 REAL Non-Micro. Comp. Confirm Table 6, p. 36 
Duarte and Young (2009) JFE US 1984-2004 REAL Micro. PIN Reject Table 10, p. 136 
Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young (2008) JFE US 1985-2000 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 5, p. 37 
Easley et al. (2002) JF US 1984-1998 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 6, p. 2213 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2010) JFQA US 1983-2001 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 6, p. 307 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) JFE US 1961-1990 REAL Micro. B/A Mixed Table 2, p. 379 
He, Lepone, and Leung (2013) IREF AU 2001-2008 VMB Micro. B/A Confirm Table 4 & 5, p. 617-8 
Hwang et al. (2013) JAE KR 2000-2004 VMB Micro. PIN Mixed Table 5, p. 158 
Hwang et al. (2013) JAE KR 1995-2005 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 9, p. 162 
Kang (2010) JBF US 1984-2002 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 4, p. 2990 
Levi and Zhang (2015) MS US 1993-2003 REAL Micro. B/A Confirm Table 3, p. 361 
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Table 4: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Description of Studies Included in the Analysis (cont.) 
Study Journal* Country† 
Sampling 
Period DV: CoE¥ IV: Asymmetry£ Proxy‡ Direct Link? 
Source of 
Information§ 
Luong et al. (2011) SSRN US 1984-2006 REAL Micro. PIN Mixed Table 5, pp. 46-7 
Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) JAE US 1984-2002 VMB Micro. PIN Reject Table 7, p. 239 
Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) JAE US 1984-2002 REAL Micro. PIN Reject Table 1, p. 230 
Yan and Zhang (2014) JBF US 1983-2005 REAL Micro. PIN Confirm Table 8, p. 147 
Notes:* Journal names along with their ABS 2015 ranking are shown in the appendix. † AU: Australia; CN: China; KR: South Korea; US: United States. ¥ REAL: realised-return, VMB: valua-
tion model-based cost of equity proxy. £(Non-)Micro.: (Non-)Microstructure-based proxies. ‡ B/A: Bid/Ask-spreads; PIN: Probability of informed trading scores; Acc.Qual.: Account-
ing/Earnings Quality, Comp.: market competition, Analyst: security analyst forecast based proxy. § Information used to decide if a study confirms/rejects or finds mixed results regarding the 
direct link between Asymmetry and CoE.   
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Quantity, Precision and Asymmetry Studies  
  Quantity   Precision   Asymmetry   Total 
Sample                       
Observations 62 100% 
 
48 100% 
 
28 100% 
 
138 100% 
Studies 56 90% 
 
35 73% 
 
22 79% 
 
113 82% 
Direct Link 
           
Accept 44 71% 
 
27 56% 
 
16 57% 
 
87 63% 
Reject 6 10% 
 
8 17% 
 
4 14% 
 
18 13% 
Mixed 12 19% 
 
13 27% 
 
8 29% 
 
33 24% 
Published Work 
           
Yes 50 81% 
 
42 88% 
 
25 89% 
 
117 85% 
No 12 19% 
 
6 13% 
 
3 11% 
 
21 15% 
Publ. Quality 
           
Higher-Tier 37 60% 
 
29 60% 
 
24 86% 
 
90 65% 
Lower-Tier 25 40% 
 
19 40% 
 
4 14% 
 
48 35% 
Country 
           
US 25 40% 
 
41 85% 
 
24 86% 
 
90 65% 
Non-US 37 60% 
 
7 15% 
 
4 14% 
 
48 35% 
CoE Proxy 
           
REAL 6 10% 
 
16 33% 
 
21 75% 
 
43 31% 
VMB 50 81% 
 
26 54% 
 
7 25% 
 
83 60% 
RFB 6 10% 
 
6 13% 
 
0 0% 
 
12 9% 
Quantity Proxy 
           
Disclosure 62 100% 
       
62 45% 
thereof: FF/PF/NF 11/29/22 18/47/35% 
       
62 45% 
thereof: SCI/EXI/Dummy 38/13/11 61/21/18% 
       
62 45% 
Precision Proxy 
           
Acc. Quality 
   
41 85% 
    
41 30% 
Analyst 
   
7 15% 
    
7 5% 
Asymmetry Proxy 
           
Micro. 
      
24 86% 
 
24 17% 
Non-Micro. 
      
4 14% 
 
4 3% 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the Quantity, Precision and Asymmetry studies included in the liter-
ature review for several sample characteristics: (i) Sample: number of studies and observations included; (ii) Direct 
Link: number of observations (no. of obs.) accepting, rejecting, and finding mixed results for the link with CoE; (iii) 
Published Work: no. of obs. which are published and unpublished; (iv): Publication Quality: no. of obs. appearing in 
higher-tier journals (4 & 3 rated journals in ABS 2015 list) and lower-tier journals (ABS 2015 2 & 1 rated, unranked 
and unpublished work); (v) Country: no. of obs. focusing on US and non-US firms; (vi) CoE Proxy: no. of obs. using 
realised-return (REAL), risk factor-based (RFB) and valuation model-based (VMB) cost of equity proxies; (vii): 
Quantity Proxy: no. of obs. focusing on full-financial (FF), part-financial (PF), non-financial (NF) disclosure and 
using self-constructed indices (SCI), external third-party indices (EXI) and binary dummy variables (Dummy) to 
measures quantity; (viii) Precision Proxy: no. of obs. applying accounting quality (Acc. Quality) and analyst-based 
(Analyst) proxies; (ix) Asymmetry Proxy: no. of obs. using microstructure (Micro.) and non- microstructure-based 
proxies;   
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Table 6: Results by Disclosure Types and CoE Measures 
 
Full-Financial 
(FF) 
Partial-Financial 
(PF) 
Non-Financial  
(NF) 
Total 
RFB/VMB 
 
 
  
r:  -0.117** -0.069 -0.053 -0.075 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.215; 0.078] [-0.167; 0.060] [-0.204; 0.054] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.288 0.331 0.263 0.258 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 72.55*** 79.85*** 217.38*** 
K: 11 24 21 56 
Sample: 10,423 8,625 17,560 36,607 
REAL        
r:  - -0.025 -0.060 -0.026 
95% CI: - [-0.066; 0.017] [-0.060; -0.060]# [-0.063; 0.011] 
Se
2
Sr
2: - 0.599 - 0.686 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : - 8.34 - 8.75 
K: - 5 1 6 
Sample: - 7,460 333 7,793 
Total        
r:  -0.117** -0.048 -0.054 -0.066 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.167; 0.071] [-0.165; 0.058] [-0.190; 0.058] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.288 0.328 0.275 0.257 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 88.42*** 79.86*** 241.21*** 
K: 11 29 22 62 
Sample: 10,423 16,085 17,892 44,400 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sam-
pling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies 
(K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quan-
tity and CoE. RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL 
subsumes studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies focusing fully (FF), par-
tially (PF) or not at all (NF) on financial disclosure. # zero residual variance is used for CI calculation, given the 
error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative population variance (Sp²). 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level. 
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Table 7: Results by Disclosure Types and Disclosure Metrics 
 
Full-Financial 
(FF) 
Partial-Financial 
(PF) 
Non-Financial  
(NF) 
Total 
SCI         
r:  -0.101*** -0.039 -0.052 -0.050 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.145; 0.067] [-0.217; 0.12] [-0.179; 0.079] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.654 0.317 0.205 0.270 
χK−1
2 : 9.17* 60.00*** 63.36*** 140.89*** 
K: 6 19 13 38 
Sample: 2,537 13,934 7,098 23,569 
EXI         
r:  -0.049 -0.128* -0.026 -0.104 
95% CI: [-0.049; -0.049]# [-0.278; 0.022] [-0.026; -0.026]# [-0.231; 0.023] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 1509.313 0.500 1.980 0.594 
χK−1
2 : 0.00 18.00** 1.01 21.89** 
K: 2 9 2 13 
Sample: 456 1,492 127 2,075 
Dummy         
r:  -0.126** -0.062 -0.055* -0.083 
95% CI: [-0.232; -0.020] [-0.062; -0.062]# [-0.109; 0.00] [-0.186; 0.020] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.117 - 0.456 0.173 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 25.60*** - 15.36** 63.47*** 
K: 3 1 7 11 
Sample: 7,430 659 10,667 18,756 
Total         
r:  -0.117** -0.048 -0.054 -0.066 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.167; 0.071] [-0.165; 0.058] [-0.190; 0.058] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.288 0.328 0.275 0.257 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 88.42*** 79.86*** 241.21*** 
K: 11 29 22 62 
Sample: 10,423 16,085 17,892 44,400 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sam-
pling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies 
(K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quan-
tity and CoE. Distinction is made between type of disclosures—studies focusing fully (FF), partially (PF) or not at all 
(NF) on financial disclosure—and disclosure metrics— studies using self-constructed disclosure indexes (SCI), ex-
ternally provided third-party indices (EXI) or simple dummy variables to distinguish between disclosing and non-
disclosing firms (Dummy). # zero residual variance is used for CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being 
larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes signifi-
cance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.   
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Table 8: Results by Disclosure Types and Disclosure Regimes 
Panel A: US and Non-US Firms    
 
Full-Financial  
(FF) 
Partial-Financial  
(PF) 
Non-Financial  
(NF) 
Total 
US         
r:  -0.050 -0.056** -0.022 -0.039 
95% CI: [-0.136; 0.035] [-0.102; -0.010] [-0.073; 0.028] [-0.104; 0.026] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.484 0.720 0.592 0.539 
χK−1
2 : 12.39* 13.88 15.20* 46.38*** 
K: 6 10 9 25 
Sample: 3,346 6,986 9,267 19,599 
Non-US         
r:  -0.131 -0.173* -0.098 -0.139 
95% CI: [-0.131; -0.131]# [-0.375; 0.028] [-0.264; 0.069] [-0.361; 0.037] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 1.352 0.437 0.517 0.478 
χK−1
2 : 2.96 34.33*** 19.33** 60.68*** 
K: 4 15 10 29 
Sample: 768 1,720 1,266 3,754 
Panel B: High and Low Disclosure Regulation   
HIGH         
r:  -0.117** -0.035 -0.053 -0.062 
95% CI: [-0.220; -0.014] [-0.093; 0.024] [-0.166; 0.061] [-0.176; 0.052] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.262 0.544 0.203 0.221 
χK−1
2 : 38.13*** 27.58** 69.05*** 176.65*** 
K: 10 15 14 39 
Sample: 9,978 14,118 16,351 40,446 
LOW         
r:  -0.111 -0.153 -0.083 -0.126 
95% CI: [-0.111; -0.111]# [-0.381; 0.075] [-0.187; 0.021] [-0.314; 0.061] 
Se
2
Sr
2: - 0.320 0.721 0.400 
χK−1
2 : - 37.47*** 9.71 50.04*** 
K: 1 12 7 20 
Sample: 445 1,800 944 3,188 
Table continued next page.  
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Table 8: Results by Disclosure Types and Disclosure Regimes (cont.) 
Panel C: High (HDE) and Low Disclosure Environments (LDE)    
 
Full-Financial  
(FF) 
Partial-Financial  
(PF) 
Non-Financial  
(NF) 
Total 
HDE         
r:  -0.060 -0.056*** -0.026 -0.043 
95% CI: [-0.159; 0.039] [-0.097; -0.015] [-0.107; 0.054] [-0.122; 0.037] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.490 0.782 0.426 0.489 
χK−1
2 : 18.38** 14.07 28.14*** 65.46*** 
K: 9 11 12 32 
Sample: 3,668 7,016 9,590 20,275 
LDE         
r:  -0.111 -0.186* -0.083 -0.141 
95% CI: [-0.111; -0.111]# [-0.398; 0.026] [-0.187; 0.021] [-0.326; 0.044] 
Se
2
Sr
2: - 0.390 0.721 0.429 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : - 30.74*** 9.71 46.66*** 
K: 1 12 7 20 
Sample: 445 1,491 944 2,879 
Total         
r:  -0.117** -0.048 -0.054 -0.066 
95% CI: [-0.215; -0.018] [-0.167; 0.071] [-0.165; 0.058] [-0.190; 0.058] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.288 0.328 0.275 0.257 
χK−1
2 : 38.14*** 88.42*** 79.86*** 241.21*** 
K: 11 29 22 62 
Sample: 10,423 16,085 17,892 44,400 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sam-
pling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies 
(K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quan-
tity and CoE. Distinction is made between types of disclosures (i.e., studies focusing fully (FF), partially (PF) or not 
at all (NF) on financial disclosure) and the following disclosure regimes: Panel A reports results for US and non-US 
firms, Panel B categorises studies according to their disclosure regulation scores, with studies below the sample 
average of 0.83 being assigned to the LOW group and the remainder to the HIGH group; Panel C distinguishes 
between high disclosure environments (HDE: US, CA, UK) and a low disclosure environments (LDE: AUS, BR, CH, 
DE, EG, FR, ID, MY, SP, TW) with the respective countries assigned to each group in parentheses. # zero residual 
variance is used for CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) 
resulting in a negative population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.   
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Table 9: Results by Information Precision and CoE Measures 
 
Acc.Qual. Analyst Total 
RFB/VMB 
   
r:  -0.074 -0.142*** -0.082 
95% CI: [-0.168; 0.020] [-0.211; -0.073] [-0.183; 0.019] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.324 0.554 0.304 
χK−1
2 : 83.21*** 9.03* 105.13*** 
K: 27 5 32 
Sample: 24,194 3,130 27,324 
REAL 
   
r:  -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 
95% CI: [-0.014; -0.014]# [-0.053; 0.031] [-0.014; -0.014]# 
Se
2
Sr
2: 2.484 0.517 1.675 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 5.63 3.87 9.55 
K: 14 2 16 
Sample: 23,826 4,111 27,937 
Total 
   
r:  -0.044 -0.067 -0.048 
95% CI: [-0.129; 0.040] [-0.206; 0.071] [-0.142; 0.047] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.313 0.161 0.270 
χK−1
2 : 131.18*** 43.50*** 177.89*** 
K: 41 7 48 
Sample: 48,020 7,241 55,261 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sam-
pling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies 
(K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between Information Preci-
sion and CoE. RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; 
REAL subsumes studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies applying account-
ing quality (Acc.Qual.) and analyst-based (Analyst) proxies for Precision. # zero residual variance is used for CI 
calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative popu-
lation variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.    
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Table 10: Results by Accounting Quality and CoE Measures 
 
AQ-Metric Non-AQ-Metric Total 
RFB/VMB 
   
r:  -0.082 -0.063*** -0.074 
95% CI: [-0.203; 0.038] [-0.083; -0.043] [-0.168; 0.020] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.220 0.918 0.324 
χK−1
2 : 68.04*** 13.08 83.21*** 
K: 15 12 27 
Sample: 13,891 10,303 24,194 
REAL 
   
r:  -0.011 -0.020 -0.014 
95% CI: [-0.011; -0.011]# [-0.020; -0.020]# [-0.014; -0.014]# 
Se
2
Sr
2: 2.060 3.889 1.675 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 3.40 1.80 5.63 
K: 7 7 14 
Sample: 13,998 9,827 23,826 
Total 
   
r:  -0.046 -0.042** -0.044 
95% CI: [-0.154; 0.061] [-0.074; -0.010] [-0.129; 0.040] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.206 0.780 0.313 
χK−1
2 : 106.59*** 24.37 131.18*** 
K: 22 19 41 
Sample: 27,889 20,131 48,020 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sam-
pling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies 
(K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between Accounting Quali-
ty and CoE. RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL 
subsumes studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies applying an accrual 
quality metric (AQ-Metric) and those alternative accounting quality measures (Non-AQ-Metric). # zero residual 
variance is used for CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) 
resulting in a negative population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.   
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Table 11: Results by Disclosure Types, CoE Measures and Publication Quality 
 
Full-Financial  
(FF) 
Partial-Financial  
(PF) 
Non-Financial  
(NF) 
Total 
RFB/VMB Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.119** -0.044 -0.057 -0.133 -0.061 -0.040 -0.081 -0.055 
95% CI: [-0.219; -0.020] [-0.044; -0.044] [-0.172; 0.058] [-0.352; 0.085] [-0.187; 0.064] [-0.121; 0.041] [-0.208; 0.047] [-0.184; 0.073] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.252 9.654 0.322 0.410 0.194 0.469 0.209 0.401 
χK−1
2 : 35.8*** 0.2 37.3*** 29.3*** 56.7*** 21.3** 153.3*** 59.8*** 
K: 9 2 12 12 11 10 32 24 
Sample: 10,033 390 7,286 1,340 11,007 6,553 28,325 8,282 
REAL Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  - - -0.018 -0.158 -0.060 - -0.020 -0.158 
95% CI: - - [-0.018; -0.018]# [-0.158; -0.158]# [-0.060; -0.060]# - [-0.020; -0.020]# [-0.158; -0.158]# 
Se
2
Sr
2: - - 2.534 - - - 2.329 - 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : - - 1.6 - - - 2.2 - 
K: - - 4 1 1 - 5 1 
Sample: - - 7,099 361 333 - 7,432 361 
Total Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.119** -0.044 -0.038 -0.138 -0.061 -0.040 -0.068 -0.059 
95% CI: [-0.219; -0.020] [-0.044; -0.044]# [-0.124; 0.049] [-0.328; 0.051] [-0.184; 0.061] [-0.121; 0.041] [-0.170; 0.034] [-0.190; 0.071] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.252 9.654 0.362 0.440 0.212 0.469 0.209 0.393 
χK−1
2 : 35.8*** 0.2 44.2*** 29.6*** 56.7*** 21.3** 177.1*** 63.6*** 
K: 9 2 16 13 12 10 37 25 
Sample: 10,033 390 14,385 1,701 11,340 6,553 35,757 8,643 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sampling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the 
chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies (K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between information quantity and CoE. 
RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; REAL subsumes studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made be-
tween studies focusing fully (FF), partially (PF) or not at all (NF) on financial disclosure. Higher-Tier: 4 & 3 rated journals in ABS2015; Lower-Tier: 2 & 1 rated journals in ABS 2015, 
unranked and unpublished work. # zero residual variance is used for CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a negative 
population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 - 61 - 
Table 12: Results by Accounting Quality, CoE Measures and Publication Quality 
 
Acc.Qual. Analyst Total 
RFB/VMB Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.092* -0.054 -0.154*** -0.136*** -0.097* -0.067 
95% CI: [-0.194; 0.009] [-0.119; 0.011] [-0.248; -0.060] [-0.187; -0.086] [-0.202; 0.009] [-0.153; 0.019] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.273 0.523 0.555 0.580 0.283 0.376 
χK−1
2 : 47.6*** 26.8** 5.4* 3.4* 56.5*** 42.6*** 
K: 13 14 3 2 16 16 
Sample: 12,698 11,496 994 2,136 13,692 13,632 
REAL Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.014 -0.019 -0.011 - -0.014 -0.019 
95% CI: [-0.014; -0.014]# [-0.019; -0.019# [-0.053; 0.031] - [-0.014; -0.014]# [-0.019; -0.019# 
Se
2
Sr
2: 2.019 20.503 0.517 - 1.389 20.503 
𝜒𝐾−1
2 : 5.4 0.1 3.9 - 9.4 0.1 
K: 11 3 2 - 13 3 
Sample: 22,081 1,745 4,111 - 26,192 1,745 
Total Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier Higher-Tier Lower-Tier 
r:  -0.043 -0.049* -0.039 -0.136*** -0.042 -0.061 
95% CI: [-0.135; 0.050] [-0.108; 0.009] [-0.162; 0.085] [-0.187; 0.086] [-0.139; 0.055] [-0.144; 0.021] 
Se
2
Sr
2: 0.235 0.591 0.197 0.580 0.283 0.411 
χK−1
2 : 102.0*** 28.8** 25.4*** 3.4* 127.5*** 46.3*** 
K: 24 17 5 2 29 19 
Sample: 34,779 13,241 5,105 2,136 39,884 15,377 
Notes: This contingency table reports average effect size (r), the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), the sam-
pling-error explained percentage of observed variance (𝑆𝑒
2 𝑆𝑟
2⁄ ), the chi-square statistic (𝜒𝐾−1
2 ), number of studies 
(K) and sample size as the average number of firms per year (sample) for the association between Information Preci-
sion and CoE. RFB/VMB contains studies using risk factor-based and/or valuation model-based CoE measures; 
REAL subsumes studies using realised returns as CoE proxy. Distinction is made between studies applying account-
ing quality (Acc.Qual.) and analyst-based (Analyst) proxies for Precision. Higher-Tier: 4 & 3 rated journals in 
ABS2015; Lower-Tier: 2 & 1 rated journals in ABS 2015, unranked and unpublished work. # zero residual variance 
is used for CI calculation, given the error variance (Se²) being larger than the observed variance (Sr²) resulting in a 
negative population variance (Sp²). ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.    
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
This figure illustrates the direct links between the information attributes and CoE. For each attribute, the most com-
monly used empirical measures are indicated. VMB (RFB) Valuation model-based (Risk factor-based) cost of equity 
proxies.  
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Figure 2: Information Quantity on CoE – Main Findings  
This figure summarises key findings from the meta-analysis of information quantity with CoE. Panel A shows average 
effect sizes for different measures of CoE, while Panel B distinguishes between disclosure types. Panel C reports 
average effect sizes between Quantity and CoE where average high (low) equals the mean effect size of US, HIGH, 
HDE (Non-US, LOW, LDE) as defined in Table 8. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.   
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Figure 3: Information Precision on CoE – Main Findings 
This figure summarises key findings from the meta-analysis of information precision with CoE. Panel A shows aver-
age effect sizes for different measures of CoE. Panel B (Panel C) reports average effect sizes between different prox-
ies for Precision (Accounting Quality) and RFB/VMB CoE proxies. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
0.10 level.   
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Figure 4: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Measurement of Cost of Equity 
The figure categorises the sample observations in respect to their general conclusion reached regarding Hypothesis 
2. Panel A shows results for all observations. Panel B and Panel C for REAL-based and VMB-Based observations, 
respectively.  
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Figure 5: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Measurement of Information Asym-
metry 
The figure categorises the sample observations in respect to their general conclusion reached regarding Hypothesis 
2: The higher (lower) the information asymmetry between investors, the higher (lower) the firm’s CoE. Panel A 
shows results for all microstructure-based observations. Panel B and Panel C for PIN-based and Bid/Ask-Spread-
Based observations, respectively.  
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Figure 6: Information Asymmetry on CoE – Main Findings 
This figure summarises key findings from the analysis of information asymmetry with CoE. For each link, the figure 
reports a weighted average score of association across studies (weighting: number of observations), with studies 
rejecting (confirming) the association being assigned zero (100) points and those finding mixed results given 50 
points. Panel A (Panel B) shows average scores for different CoE (Microstructure) proxies. 
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